packetized

Joined 13 years ago

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Sep 4
tall, scruffy, ginger.

[ my public key: https://keybase.io/robison; my proof: https://keybase.io/robison/sigs/Vs1MsNRJR9wR9ux_h6I-PLapP-TCppHvAdOUojx0Q9U ]

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Comment · 4 years ago
I dare say that it’s annoying you as a result of cognitive dissonance about your employer paying six figures to migrate to it.

If you’re being paid well, obviously you’ll be annoyed by concepts contrary to your work.

e: edits are hated, but the downvotes prove out: Kubernetes is simply OpenStack for hipsters.

Comment · 6 years ago
The finding in TLS-01-003 is surprising to me, mostly because it presupposes a lack of sophistication among users of this library who are also using X.509 NameConstraints. From RFC5280:

  For example, a name constraint for "class C" subnet 192.0.2.0 is represented as the octets C0 00 02 00 FF FF FF 00, representing the CIDR notation 192.0.2.0/24 (mask 255.255.255.0).
As they mention in the findings:

  Typically, subnet masks should be contiguous and the presence of a non-contiguous mask might indicate a typo (such as 225.255.255.0 vs. 255.255.255.0), or potentially an attempt to bypass an access control scheme. Therefore, it is recommended to treat certificates containing non-contiguous subnet masks in their name constraints as invalid.
This seems to run counter to the intent in the RFC. By allowing for a four-octet subnet mask, instead of simply an int to represent the a contiguous CIDR mask, the RFC authors may have intended that more complex IP-based NameConstraints could be constructed. This certainly would make a huge difference for something like an intermediate (CA:TRUE), where it becomes much more economical to specify a sparse mask for a highly templated network. Think certs for network equipment or VoIP phones with regular, repeatable IP addressing across many locations/networks. E.g., a VoIP provisioning system that has an intermediate issuing CA with the following NameConstraints: IP:172.16.0.0/255.255.1.239.

If any change comes from this specific finding, I would hope that it's simply a flag to allow or disallow the use of discontiguous masks. I do understand that this is specific to WebPKI; having said that, if a client is implemented using rustls (with these recommendations enabled) and it happens across a perfectly valid certificate issued by an intermediate with a discontiguous mask in the NameConstraints, presumably it would fail or otherwise break. And yes, I have previously configured precisely this in an intermediate CA.

Comment · 6 years ago
This is absolutely a false dichotomy. A home-cooked meal is not one conventionally thought of as being from items hyperlocally sourced. At least, not in the last 70-100 years. We’ve had Sears Roebuck and the like for quite some time.
Comment · 6 years ago
The fact that the OP had to resort to unofficial channels to get satisfaction is the problem, full stop.
Comment · 6 years ago
I would say that is much more damning of their state of customer interest.
Comment · 6 years ago
That you would have to communicate this to a customer via HN is pretty damning.
Comment · 7 years ago
Vault is a phenomenal tool, full stop.
Comment · 7 years ago
Agreed, I just found the juxtaposition of the two confusing at first.
Comment · 7 years ago
On mobile, this site has a “toggle high contrast” widget on the left side that seems to directly contravene the points made in the article.
Comment · 7 years ago
Comment · 7 years ago
The first two nota benes explicitly describe this document being outdated and not what most people expect when it comes to “memory controller”. I am not certain that citing this is a great example.

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