other8026
Joined 1 year ago
Joined 1 year ago
> Google committed a fix on June 15th and it was shipped in the security preview patches in mid-July. GrapheneOS shipped it in our security preview releases in July. It's in the upcoming November security bulletin but a patch was pushed to AOSP in October:
> https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/tel...
I haven't had this issue myself and fortunately GrapheneOS has its scopes features and more are coming, so it's still possible to use a more private and secure OS without having to cave in like you're saying. For example, WhatsApp might think it needs access to contacts and GrapheneOS users can let the app think it has access to everything while it really doesn't.
Also, what makes you think that apps that demand too much will never exist on other OSes? You seem to be blaming AOSP for app developers' behavior.
> Since I use the PureOS and Mobian distros (which are Debian derivatives) on my Linux phones, I can have a lot more confidence that I'm not installing anything that will harm me or spy on me.
Again, it doesn't make sense to judge entire OSes based on your experience with apps. The argument doesn't make any sense. You can't say that an entire OS is private and secure because the apps you use aren't trying to invade your privacy or exploit security holes.
> Yes, there are companies making AOSP derivatives which have good business models that respect and protect the user, such as Murena, iodé and Volla
Murena is plagued with issues, their OS rolls back privacy, is far behind on updates, they were sending data to OpenAI without informing users first, their cloud services were down for months and at one point mixed up user IDs and users' data was being synced to the wrong devices. They're hardly a good example.
iodéOS and Volla have the same problems with their OS as /e/OS.
> I have a personal beef
Members of the GrapheneOS project (myself included) call these projects out because they're misleading their users. We believe that people have the right to privacy and it's awful to see people being duped into using OSes that aren't actually private.
It's also ridiculous that we are attacking anyone. Facts aren't attacks and it's ironic that you name Murena and iodéOS in the same paragraph and accuse _us_ of attacking other projects.
Gael Duval has attacked GrapheneOS many times. He has called us toxic and violent and he has even attacked our supporters by calling them idiots and zealots. He even said that devices with strong privacy and security are for criminals and pedophiles. It's insane that someone in his position would even say such a thing.
iodéOS is or was at least partnered with someone who has also attacked GrapheneOS regularly, Robert Braxman. He has also insulted members of our project. He has also told clear lies about GrapheneOS on his channel in order to promote his less private and secure devices. He is a scam artist with a YouTube following.
In other cases, banks add Play Integrity checks to their apps, which is a more complex subject. In short, many banking apps check for the basic integrity verdict, which GrapheneOS can get. In other cases, the checks are not implemented properly, and GrapheneOS has a toggle which often gets those apps to work. Finally, a very small number of banking apps require the strong integrity verdict and the apps will refuse to run on GrapheneOS.
Although there are no statistics about this, it does seem that a majority of banking apps work or can be made to work with different compatibility toggles.
The narrative that GrapheneOS is so focused on security that it affects usability, especially given the context, is nonsense. The change that's being discussed here doesn't affect GrapheneOS or other non-GMS operating systems. The only affected OSes are the ones that install Google apps with privileged permissions.
If you want to switch to something else, go ahead. GrapheneOS is still a better overall choice.
GrapheneOS doesn't have such a narrow focus. As we keep saying, GrapheneOS prioritizes privacy, security, and Android app compatibility. Given those three things:
Privacy: microG's leaks and failure to implement other checks and there's arguably no real gain in privacy since the Sandboxed Google Play approach means Google Play Services and Store don't have privileged permissions.
Security: microG needs privileged permissions to work properly and can also download Google binaries and runs them in that privileged context, depending on settings
App compatibility: It's an incomplete reimplementation. Even microG's GitHub says as much.
Why would GrapheneOS take so many steps back just because the only real compelling argument in favor of microG is "Google bad"?
You are accusing us of "attacking" other groups when we're repeatedly pulled into conversations and we give objective answers and respond to misinformation about GrapheneOS. We have every right to correct misinformation about GrapheneOS. We have every right to defend ourselves against harassment.
Objective facts aren't "attacks." Why are you misrepresenting what we say? Isn't it better if people can make informed decisions?
Look at ForHackernews' comments and you'll understand why we counter them.
What's toxic about responding to people attacking GrapheneOS?
GrapheneOS isn't a single person. One or two of us responding to misinformation on socials doesn't mean work isn't getting done. Unfortunately there are people who spend a lot of their own time making new accounts and attacking GrapheneOS instead of doing something more productive with their own time.
Within the project, there's a lot of discussion and collaboration. Daniel is the most famous of all of us because he started the project, but we all work together and value each other's opinions. You can see the same in the issue tracker and other places as well. All of us, Daniel included, are happy to consider other ideas or approaches.
Instead of making some broad accusation about someone, you should be more specific. I hope that your bitterness isn't because one of us rejected a feature request or explained why our team implemented something in a specific way that you disagree with.
GrapheneOS is more deGoogled than alternatives, so if you're thinking privacy = deGoogling, then GrapheneOS is a good option.
But you seem to be under the impression that microG improves privacy. That's not the case when you look at the big picture. Consider why people need microG in the first place. It's basically there to pretend to be Google Play Services for apps that rely on Google Play Services. Which apps are those? Apps with Google libraries in them.
So, pretend apps with Google libraries are an "app & mini Google Play Services", and the breakdown is like this:
---
App & mini Google Play Services = access is restricted, like other regular apps.
App & mini Google Play Services + Sandboxed Google Play (unprivileged) = virtually the same access as above
App & mini Google Play Services + microG (privileged) = Google has the same access as the situations above, but with worse app compatibility, worse security (especially because of privileged access), and worse privacy (leaks).
GrapheneOS's approach is far different from microG's. It's not about rebuilding everything from scratch, it's about making Google Play Services behave as a non-privileged app.