ng55QPSK
Joined 5 years ago
Karma
333
Submissions
117
Member since
Feb 25
Recent submissions
Comment · 2 years ago
which means: you tell the compiler
Comment · 2 years ago
i can understand everything, but why is Apple as global company fixes jobs like this to a single site?
Comment · 3 years ago
Is the same infrastructure available in Windows and MacOS?
Comment · 4 years ago
Do we know, where it is submitted?
Comment · 4 years ago
At home we use a phrase from an interview with a EU politician that was done BEFORE the ukraine war and asked about the US/CIA warnings of an upcomming war and he said "Always remember, the CIA was the agency that told US presidents for years the vietnam war would be over next week" ...
Comment · 4 years ago
i still don't understand. Should i put a bet (like €50), i can find an operator that closes such databases, or that you find an operator that doesn't?
I'm part of the mobile communication industry (while being in research) and part of my job is interacting with operators.
Comment · 4 years ago
It shocked some managers in telco, something we consider a good thing ...
Comment · 4 years ago
Well, you're invited to join research on network ... because it's impossible to hide your ID from your access network. Tor and similar can hide your ID in transport, but that's no option in RAN.
Comment · 4 years ago
So you have ID41323 and ID53242 over night (or at daytime) in the same location, how do you map this back to names?
It's not impossible, but you need data that exists (like house-to-name mapping) from databases outside of the reach of the operators.
And the location information in the network is only as precise as needed. Most of the time this is a cell area, so 100s of m2.
Comment · 4 years ago
You just explained the TMSI - something that was used since GSM networks in the early 90s
Comment · 4 years ago
Serious answer: I have seen operators taking this serious. It's also a european trend not to blindly accept law enforcement requests to open data anymore.
For US companies: read something on the recent twitter example.
Comment · 4 years ago
i'd recommend to watch the presentation https://media.ccc.de/v/mch2022-273-openran-5g-hacking-just-g... in which it's made clearer, that the telco part wasn't the issue. 5G systems can be operated rather secure, but operators or subcontractors that build these cloud installation have strange ideas about trust and config.
On the topic of 'telcos don't take security seriously', CoryD recently wrote some wise words in https://pluralistic.net/2022/08/12/regulatory-uncapture/#con...
"The public-private surveillance partnership is very old, and it's key to monopolists' strategy. It took 69 years to break up AT&T, because every time trustbusters came close, America's cops and spies and military would spring into action, insisting that the Bell System was America's "national champion," needed to defend it from foreign enemies. The Pentagon rescued Ma Bell from breakup in the 50s by claiming that the Korean War couldn't be won without AT&T's help"
I know some people in designing 5G, that were rather frustrated by outside influence on "can we have another unsafe option also, just in case we need it?"
Comment · 4 years ago
Both informations are abstract identifiers and are decoded in a database to 'real' values only, PHY doesn't care about your decrypted ID. If the operator keeps that database closed, a reasonable privacy of who and where can be done.
Comment · 4 years ago
Actually in 5G network there is almost nothing that isn't encrypted. What Karsten decribes is that cloud installations very often trust the infrastructure, but that's no special 5G problem.