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Joined 12 years ago
Joined 12 years ago
IMO accessibility is an under-discussed benefit of the recent AI improvements. I've recovered from my RSI (typing injury) enough to use a keyboard a moderate amount but doubt I could ever go back to shredding through a codebase like I used to. In an earlier era I might have left the field entirely.
But still, even if all one has to do is read diffs and mumble to Claude, there's no getting around fatigue and brain fog when it's severe enough.
If only they had had a claude write the post, it'd be full of citations, inspiration credit etc.
Generally, models of the same class should be able to coordinate quite well without communicating. But also, this could be being exploited to detect this kind of thing early
Or, it would be if it was intentional. It's a bit suspicious but it is probably incidental or opportunistic... though I do really struggle to see why this tool wasn't made better use of internally to actually harden their infra against the big scary AI they were testing.
Not saying the intro of agents capable enough to exploit the latter isn't meaningful, but we should not trust the use of technical terms to give us good heuristics of severity or import.
Ie, an agent "breaking out" of its local harness "sandbox" is trivial, and so is discovering a "zero-day" in a half-maintained internal piece of utility infra nobody put serious effort into securing.
Now, if I see something like a collaborative red-team effort where a frontier model gets into a replicated prod env setup by like, Big Four bank security+ops team, and manipulated balance numbers in a system of record, _that_ I'll freak out about.
Doesn't that undermine all good-faith discourse on cybersecurity safeguards, controlled usage etc? Or is that overstating the case (I'm not a security researcher myself so kinda parroting).
My biggest question skimming over the docs is what a workflow for reviewing and applying overlay changes to the out-of-cwd dirs would be.
Also, bit tangential but if anyone has slightly more in-depth resources for grasping the security trade-offs between these kind of Linux-leveraging sandboxes, containers, and remote VMs I'd appreciate it. The author here implies containers are still more secure in principle, and my intuition is that there's simply less unknowns from my perspective, but I don't have a firm understanding.
Anyhow, kudos to the author again, looks useful.
Maybe I should have said "obvious to me," but I guess I just struggle to see how a serious crack at using modern opus in claude code doesn't make it obvious at this point.
I'd really recommend trying the "spike out a self-contained minimal version of this rearchitecture/migration and troubleshoot it iteratively until it works, then make a report on findings" use-case for anyone that hasn't had luck with them thus far and is serious about trying to reach conclusions based on direct experience.
IE, using agents to iterate through many possible approaches, spike out migrations, etc might save a project a year of misadventures, re-designs, etc, but that productivity gain _subtracts_ the intermediate versions that _didn't_ end up being shipped.
As others have mentioned, I think yak-shaving is now way more automated. IE, If I want to take a new terminal for a spin, throw together a devtool to help me think about a specific problem better, etc, I can do it with very low friction. So "personal" productivity is way higher.
The models are increasingly capable in impressive ways. Maybe the next gen will enable the "sales critter" to slop out commercially viable software with no tech know-how. If not, I'm sure we'll assume the next can, and if not that, the next.
But feigning confidence about the shape and nature of this unfurling sea-change is absurd when the high-profile examples we have are like, what, moltbook? And denigrate _all_ potential ingenuity and insight unilaterally into the bargain? What a careless way of looking at the world
I ran their tool with an otherwise empty CLAUDE.md, and ran `claude /context`, which showed 3.1k tokens used by this approach (1.6% of the opus context window, bit more than the default system prompt. 8.3% is system tools).
Otherwise it's an interesting finding. The nudge seems like the real winner here, but potential further lines of inquiry that would be really illuminating: 1. How do these approaches scale with model size? 2. How are they impacted by multiple such clauses/blocks? Ie maybe 10 `IMPORTANT` rules dilute their efficacy 3. Can we get best of both worlds with specialist agents / how effective are hierarchical routing approaches really? (idk if it'd make sense for vercel specifically to focus on this though)
My comment on the cursor post for context: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46625491
Product is still fairly beta, but in Sculptor[^1] we have an MCP that provides agent & human with suggestions along the lines of "the agent didn't actually integrate the new module" or "the agent didn't actually run the tests after writing them." It leads to some interesting observations & challenges - the agents still really like ignoring tool calls compared to human messages b/c they "know better" (and sometimes they do).