legutierr

The article talks about being “receipt free” as a required feature of any electronic voting system.

Fine. But by that standard, in a world where someone can bring their phone or AI glasses into the voting booth to record the whole voting process, how can any voting system be deemed secure? Anyone can show anyone else how they voted.

Event better is his response to the comment.

> I was looking for a job during working on this and absolutely got some disappointing rejections, and one was because of my lack of skillset on things like this in a big tech company's interview. I literally failed the technical screening. Oh well.

I don’t think you have deferred resolving the dilemma—you have firmly decided the question in favor of your product and the LLMs you are using!

This feels like a ghost of the internet of the 1990s.

This writeup deserves its own website, something with minimal CSS, where you'll discover a bunch of family snapshots and party photos if you click around.

Sure.

Exactly. I often wish GitHub had a messaging capability, for these same reasons.

Ok, what is it that he is after?

> Not sure how one can design a system robust to these two threats.

The US at various time has had a system robust to these threats. A prerequisite has been an educated and well-informed electorate with at least a large majority committed to a shared set of national values.

> If we move all crypto to purpose-made hardware, someone could just start trying to target the messages to/from the crypto system.

This is one of the technical advantages of a blockchain-based system. As long as the keys are protected and signatures are generated in a secure environment, then the content of the message doesn't need to be secret to be secure.

It's not a solution to situations where privacy is desired, but if the reason for secrecy is simply to ensure that transactions are properly authorized (by avoiding the leakage of passwords and session information) then keeping the signature process secure should be sufficient even where general secrecy cannot be maintained.

> Where possible try utilizing HSMs, yubikeys, secure enclaves - any specialized hardware that has been hardened to protect key material.

Are there any circumstances where this hardware is accessible in the browser? As I understand, it is not generally available (if at all) for any cryptography you might want to do in the browser.