krooj

Scammy dentistry seems to be as American as apple pie to me. I grew up in Toronto, had braces as a teenager to correct a cross-bite, and was left with a permanent lingual arch wire to prevent shift. Those wires are held in place with bonding material - same shit they use to fill cavities - and wear down over time, requiring re-attachment. So I moved down to SoCal for work, and some time around 2015, the wire needed some work. I went to a local dentist that was recommended by a friend, only to have that dentist use so much bonding material that she fused two teeth together. Incensed, I went back and demanded to have it fixed so that I could floss. She blithely claimed my teeth wouldn't shift in my 30s and simply removed it instead of fixing her mistake. Fast forward a handful of years, and I have awful TMJ problems and require another round of ortho because that cross-bite returned. I've also had the gratuitous cavity scam pulled on me by a dentist in San Jose.

Dentists and dentistry in the US seems to me to be a scam. You've got a plethora of schools of varying quality, pumping out dentists with extreme student debt, all of various quality. By contrast, it seems to me that dentistry schooling back home worked much like other medical training and licensure - HIGHLY regulated and only admitting the absolute cream-of-the-crop applicants, resulting in much more uniform, regulated, and higher quality of patient care.

My approach to dentists in the US is now akin to a car dealership: go in wondering how you're going to get fucked over and be prepared to say no to everything.

Same!

Oh wow - seeing my own work in the wild is ... wild. I implemented the RAS end of this for Atlassian. There will certainly be iterations around this flow - CIMD, better tenancy support, etc., but all the folks involved in delivering this at Anthropic, Okta, and here at Atlassian were fantastic.

My man, all these fuckers use the same parasitic management consultancies. That's why all this shit looks the same.

Interesting - I wonder if this isn't a case of theft on a refresh token that was minted by a non-confidential 3LO flow w/PKCE. That would explain how a leaked refresh token could then be used to obtain access, but does the Vercel A/S not implement any refresh token reuse detection? i.e.: you see the same R/T more than once, you nuke the entire session b/c it's assumed the R/T was compromised.

Question - from the perspective of the actual silicon, are these NPUs just another form of SIMD? If so, that's laughable sleight of hand and the circuits will be relegated to some mothball footnote in the same manner as AVX512, etc.

To be fair, SIMD made a massive difference for early multimedia PCs for things like music playback, gaming, and composited UIs.

The comment in lines 163 - 172 make some claims that are outright false and/or highly A/S dependent, to the point where I question the validity of this post entirely. While it's possible that an A/S can be pseudo-generated based on lots of training data, each implementation makes very specific design choices: i.e.: Auth0's A/S allows for a notion of "leeway" within the scope of refresh token grant flows to account for network conditions, but other A/S implementations may be far more strict in this regard.

My point being: assuming you have RFCs (which leave A LOT to the imagination) and some OSS implementations to train on, each implementation usually has too many highly specific choices made to safely assume an LLM would be able to cobble something together without an amount of oversight effort approaching simply writing the damned thing yourself.

This is one of those cases where I would hope that extremely strong federalism is exercised from Ottawa: essentially, Alberta could be dissolved, stripped of its provincial status and relegated to a territory. From that point, allow for further subdivision to the various First Nations people, allowing reformation into other territories or offer provincial status. The rest of it could be federally administered - see how they like that.

As much as it pains me to say it, Canada's diversity is also it's weakness, and there needs to be precedent - perhaps not as severe as in the US - that you do NOT leave the dominion.

Yep - I remember the CCAT from 4th grade that resulted in my being placed into a different class for 5th. AFAIK, we were given this test "cold" (no prep) and I remember it being timed.

> In short, Open ID Connect is quite accurately described as an Authentication standard. But OAuth 2.0 has little to do with Authorization. It allows clients to specify the "scope" parameter, but does not determine how scopes are parsed, when user and client are permitted to request or grant a certain scope and what kind of access control model (RBAC, ABAC, PBAC, etc.) is used. That's ok, since it leaves the implementers with a lot of flexibility, but it clearly means OAuth 2.0 is not an authorization standard. It only concerns itself with requesting authorization in unstructured form[3].

This misses the mark - scopes are abstractions for capabilities granted to the authorized bearer (client) of the issued access token. These capabilities are granted by the resource owner, let's say, a human principal, in the case of the authorization_code grant flow, in the form of a prompt for consent. The defined capabilities/scopes are specifically ambiguous as to how they would/should align with finer-grained runtime authorization checks (RBAC, etc), since it's entirely out of the purview of the standard and would infringe on underlying product decisions that may have been established decades prior. Moreover, scopes are overloaded in the OAuth2.0/OIDC ecosystem: some trigger certain authorization server behaviours (refresh token, OIDC, etc), whereas others are concerned with the protected resource.

It's worth noting that the ambiguity around scopes and fine-grained runtime access permissions is an industry unto itself :)

RFC 9396 is interesting, but naive, and for a couple of reasons: 1) it assumes that information would like to be placed on the front-channel; 2) does not scale in JWT-based token systems without introducing heavier back-channel state.

I personally do not view OIDC as an authentication standard - at least not a very good one - since all it can prove is that the principal was valid within a few milliseconds of the iat on that id_token. The recipient cannot and should not take receipt of this token as true proof of authentication, especially when we consider that the authorization server delegates authentication to a separate system. The true gap that OIDC fills is the omission of principal identification from the original OAuth2.0 specification. Prior to OIDC, many authorization servers would issue principal information as part of their response to a token introspection endpoint.

> The industry predominately rewards writing code, not designing software.

The sad part of this is that code is absolutely a side-effect of design and conception: without a reason and reasonable approach, code shouldn't exist. I really think that the relative austerity happening in industry right now will shine a light on poor design: if your solution to solving poorly understood spaces was to add yet another layer of indirection in the form of a new "microservice" as the problem space changed over time, it's probably more likely that there was an inherent poor underlying understanding of the domain and lack of planning extensibility in anticipation. Essentially, code (bodies) and compute aren't as "cheap" as they were when money was free, so front-loading intelligent design and actually thinking about your space and it's use-cases becomes more and more important.

Linus always has a great way of summarizing what others might be thinking (nebulously). What's being said in the article is really mirrored in the lost art of DDD, and when I say "lost" I mean that most developers I encounter these days are far more concerned with algorithms and shuttling JSON around than figuring out the domain they're working within and modelling entities and interactions. In modern, AWS-based, designs, this looks like a bunch of poorly reasoned GSIs in DDB, anemic objects, and script-like "service" layers that end up being hack upon hack. Maybe there was an implicit acknowledgement that the domain's context would be well defined enough within the boundaries of a service? A poor assumption, if you ask me.

I don't know where our industry lost design rigor, but it happened; was it in the schools, the interviewing pipeline, lowering of the bar, or all of the above?

Weird - this is the first place I saw the "internet" on display as a kid. Shame to see it close in such an unceremonious way.