kopecs

Do you not think it a bit too hyperbolic to throw scare quotes around experts and imply the only people who can have opinions on systemic risk are software engineers? I don't think it is unreasonable for people who haven't run or worked for a hosting service to have opinions on the policy aspect or economic impact of hyperscalers.

Assuming you're referring to Thaler v. Perlmutter, Thaler claimed to the copyright office that the image at issue was "autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine". So the question of "if you claim the LLM did it itself" is settled (shocker, cf. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418), but that definitely did not settle "_I_ used the LLM to do it".

I think the suggestion is that the government use of that public data could be such as to create a chilling effect. That is, the upload and interaction of the user with the private company is almost irrelevant: it is just part of the antecedent to the government's conduct.

If you believe the government would only use that data for just purposes then you probably wouldn't then believe that there is a 1A issue. But if you think the government would use it to identify persons at a protest and then take adverse actions against them on the basis of their presence alone (which to be clear, seems distinguished from the immediate instance) you would probably think there is a 1A issue.

AIUI Because if you have a zero data retention agreement you are necessarily not in the class of records at issue (since enterprise customers records are not affected, again AIUI per platinffs' original motion which might be because they don't think they're relevant for market harm or something).

So I think that this is more so an artefact of the parameters than an outcome of some mechanism of law.

I don't think it is accurate to say that the data becomes the government's or they have to act as an informant (I think that implies a bit more of an active requirement than responding to a subpoena), but I agree with the gist.

Do you think the 4th amendment enjoins courts from requiring the preservation of records as part of discovery? The court is just requiring OpenAI to maintain records it already maintains and segregate them. Even if one thinks that _is_ a government seizure, which it isn't---See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (discussing the "state agency" requirement)---no search or seizure has even occurred. There's no reasonable expectation of privacy in the records you're sending to OpenAI (you know OpenAI has them!!; See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)) and you don't have any possessory interest in the records. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).

Well, presumably the claim would be that a factor in their not having taxable income was the fact that they didn't have to amortize their development cost.

I would think it makes some amount of sense if you think they're vegetarian for some moral reason and you think you could court them to become customers.

Why do you think that? This obviously does not preclude copyright interests from existing in works which were generated using "AI" as a blanket rule; rather, this is about the fact that the applicant persistent in insisting that the author of the work was an "autonomous[] computer algorithm".

Do you think autonomous computer algorithms (to the extent we could suppose they exist, for the sake of argument) should have a statutory right to copyright?

What comparison do you think the parent comment is making? They just vaguely gesture at corporate personhood and say "what about that?"

My best reading of it is "can 'they' say that corporations can author works?" and excepting works for hire, no, "they" can't.

Yes, I agree. I don't think I am saying anything inconsistent with that.