khafra
Joined 18 years ago
Joined 18 years ago
What G.K. Chesterton said is that, if you can't make an affirmative case for the tradition's origins and show why the cause no longer applies, you should leave the tradition in place.
In the listed examples, rationalists celebrate this principle with examples such as the bitter cassava preparations of the Tukanoan people, which were very labor- and time-intensive. A much shorter processing would have eliminated the obvious, short-term toxicity of the plant, so someone scientific experiments to determine how much processing was actually necessary would likely end up damaging themselves and their reproductive prospects in ways that wouldn't show up for years or decades.
So there's evidence that the rationalist community actually appreciates tradition more strongly than the average person, and searches harder before discarding it.
I apologize if this list of counterexamples ran too long.
Reinforcement Learning (in LLMs) trains via gradient descent on a reward signal that's an imperfect proxy for the actual goal of the engineers doing the training. So, under mild optimization pressure, you get increasingly more of what you want, because that's the easiest way to increase the metric.
But as the optimization pressure increases, so do the ways to increase the metric by doing increasingly weird things. If the full action space grows sufficiently faster than the "things you actually want" subset, the amount of "things you actually want" goes to 0 under sufficient RL.
The impossibility of the tests-as-written is what prompted these models to "get creative" with their solutions, but the broken RLVR environments are what trained them to expect impossible tasks, and get creative with their solutions. Twitter user @skyesharkie published a brief expose at https://x.com/SkyeSharkie/status/2092122622834442581 a few weeks ago.
But the species would not survive, if for some reason we needed to voluntarily stop using faber-Bosch in order to do so—it would take some kind of supernatural event to convince everyone, and even then some countries would probably keep doing it.
By analogy, consider how you might respond if someone claimed that there's no possible danger from pocket-sized projectile launchers, because they would require some magic means of propulsion that didn't depend on a taut string attached to a long, flexible arm:
You could reply that atlatls can launch projectiles without using a taut string. Atlatls are not pocket-sized, but they are sufficient to establish that projectiles can be non-magically launched without a full bow. You could then go on to describe a sling, or derringer; and these would not be invalidated by your initial objection to the "magic" part.