Recent submissions

Comment · 6 years ago
Also, odds that the govt has secret radically advanced quantum computing tech and does have a QC to recover using Shor’s? (Yea, probably unlikely as it would takes millions of qubits to achieve this..)

How long before lattice based crypto is sufficiently vetted for wide deployment?

Comment · 6 years ago
What are the odds that big tech and big brother are in bed creating a huge dog and pony show to counter the post-Snowden “going dark” reality?

Given: The public knows about mass surveillance. Big tech deploys supposedly unbreakable end to end encryption. The public feels more safe and protected from Big Brother yet again.

Theory: Meanwhile, behind the scenes, government and big tech have, in secret, the ability to recover such encrypted comms. The DOJ initiative would then be part of an elaborate psyop to further deceive people into believing that FB “has their back”.

I’m going to guess that third parties have extensively reverse engineered apps such as fb messenger to ensure that it is essentially impossible for the above to be the case, since E2EE occurs at the endpoints.

Can an encryption expert weigh in here?

Edit: this also raises general concerns I have about trusting an App Store to install what is supposed to be installed, and not a backdoor’ed version of an app. Something like: Let the reverse engineers have an unmodified app, while distributing alternate versions to other unsuspecting users.

Comment · 6 years ago
One unfortunate example doesn’t make for a case either way.

My understanding is that FB (for example) would hold the keys and turn over only when compelled via warrant. Not mass surveillance.

Also, Snowden’s propaganda has worked like a charm in sowing discord in American society. Without a doubt, even if you support his actions and cause 100%, concurrently the Russian government consider the NSA to be the crown jewel of the IC. And Snowden’s actions and ongoing politics support Russia’s long term “Active Measures” campaign against the United States.

Comment · 6 years ago
We would need statistics to assert one way or another. I suspect it’s the opposite: give people the means to easily maintain their own communication networks completely out of view of the government, and some will abuse it for other kinds of low level crimes beyond petty drugs: stalking, for instance.

I’d also bet that many criminals (those beyond petty drug pushers) aren’t even sophisticated enough to understand what’s at play here, and will use FB messenger regardless of the encryption implementation. In this case, offering a means to recover encrypted comms in exceptional, warrant-backed circumstances would only be of help towards criminal investigations.

Comment · 6 years ago
If I understand right, in this example FB would hold the keys to recover the cleartext and turn it over to law enforcement only when compelled to do so with a warrant.

This isn’t extreme at all.

Comment · 6 years ago
Sorry, not following how this counters any of my points. Shenanigans via anachronistic laws or corrupt cops isn’t related to encryption, and we know sophisticated criminals can employ their own privacy tools.
Comment · 6 years ago
Not following your slippery slope argument.
Comment · 6 years ago
Offering lawful access to widely deployed encryption is hardly an extreme view. Our IC and their partners, as well as our bureaucrats, are mostly in agreement.

An extreme view might entail banning certain forms of math on the internet entirely, rather than simply regulating the widely deployed frictionless math.

Comment · 6 years ago
Bananas and bowling balls.

Based on your description, the situation you described is a shame and a failure of law enforcement to keep us safe. Not an encryption issue.

Comment · 6 years ago
Forgot to add: I don’t trust the consumer devices including a fully patched brand new iPhone. I am far more concerned about the various private interests abusing data access, data brokers, hackers potentially getting into my endpoint directly or to any of my consumer cloud assets, than I am about lawful access to recoverable encryption
Comment · 6 years ago
Yes, removing such spof’s should be a design requirement.

Yes, it’s a difficult problem with social implications, and not simply technical challenges, as you noted.

Yes, Snowden shouldn’t have so easily been able to steal so much data. Apparently the IC has installed numerous checks and balances to help prevent another such insider threat.

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