invisible

They showed a bit of this with a high production video of “how we did it” on Tuesday. The outpainting was amazing, details looked crisp, physics sim was pretty good, and the continuity for actors was good. The amount of tech they had to create and manage for the project is remarkable on its own.

There were some perspective and lighting issues, and a few small glitchy artifact moments. They probably showed about 5 minutes of footage from various parts of the movie.

Not saying that any of this was warranted, but that actually says Ross "[reaching toward] the center console" was the suspicious thing. It turns out Ross had a gun and heroine in the center console, along with a bunch of money in his pocket. So it could be that he actually was okay with him laughing?

Either way, what a manipulative tactic.

I don't understand this "[reading] his email" thing. I can't look away from the road for more than a couple of seconds without the car alerting me to pay attention while FSD is enabled. It's currently both watching for attention (eyes) and nagging on the steering wheel. Autopilot at least does the steering wheel nag every 30-60s. Failing to acknowledge these cause the car to pull over and start blaring alarms in the cabin. I'm not sure how "99% of people" can use it the way you're describing, especially for FSD.

I've personally never felt like I couldn't take control in <1s.

I set it up for a team of ~30. This makes a huge difference for mounting things like `node_modules` with lots of inodes. The difference locally is pretty astounding.

I recently did a 70 mile drive on FSD with no interventions from local suburb roads, to highway, to urban roads, to some odd roads near a zoo.

That being said, often times I've had to intervene going <10 miles on local roads because it's so cautious that I'm afraid other drivers may react poorly and cause an accident. Rarely, it has done some dangerous actions that I'd characterize as "bad driving." So no, it's not there yet and it is dangerous because of the rare situations, but it's also occasionally perfect and usually "okay."

Apple Card is very convenient, but it's not the best in the rewards arena.

For example, CapitalOne SavorOne (3% for many categories) and Wells Fargo Active Cash (2% on all purchases). There are many others that are competitive for specific situations though, including Citi Custom Cash (5% in a single category). Most of these cards also offer an intro APR and/or bonus after $X has been spent.

Not to defend SBF or suggest he did anything correct, but isn't that _negligence_? Given that the factors of the negligence benefited their operations, it still may be charged as fraud and he may be guilty in court.

Weird -- why not make the fine $604 million (or whatever they truly should owe in refunds) and allow all but, say, 4 million to be reduced?

These are a bunch of straw man arguments against what I said. There is a difference between clicking a link and an extension being able to read the contents of pages you visit -- like your bank records or credentials.

Some of these "choices" aren't actually _made_ by anyone. Even with trust of an author, if remote code is being used and a domain or server is hijacked, then the remote code could be replaced. It's a lose-lose problem for Google and not addressing this problem means worse security for casual users. The boogeyman that they will remove useful extensions is antithetical to their behavior so far.

Yes, I trust plenty of software and I'm not suggesting that extensions are bad in theory. Extensions being able to silently inject code and ownership to change at any time is a pretty bad security model. We can agree that there are _bad_ security models, right?

It's the sum of the parts in changes from manifest V2:

- no arbitrary code injection via executeScript, must be a file now

- no more remote code

- no more arbitrarily getting selected text or highlighted text on a tab

- declarativeNetRequest instead of intercepting requests

- explicit listeners on the page to help detect bad actors (vs just arbitrary JS running on the page)

It's as though nobody realizes extensions can be created or purchased by sketchy actors and that this is a huge security risk when the extensions request "all access to all sites." OK, so when setting up an account's username and password and are provided 2FA codes or recovery codes -- those can all be compromised. How can you know an extension is compromised? It's almost impossible to tell with certainty.

Things like "The Great Suspender" incident get ignored and folks assume no other extensions have the same problems.

I think the contention is that hosting is a service. Just as you are suggesting Facebook is offering a defective service (that you said should not be offered), then so are hosting providers as they similarly can't moderate granularly.

I know it's not a requirement, but running docker containers is a nontrivial headache. Additionally, running VSCode resulted in a number of frustrating bugs:

- copy+paste not working, or only working on small strings

- font size issues and anti-aliasing issues

- delays on keystrokes

Any type of advanced networking in Linux was also a huge headache (e.g. a wireguard interface) and didn't interop with the browser. So as needed, I was at one point running both the Chrome on ChromeOS and another Chrome in Linux.