hdhzy
Joined 9 years ago
Joined 9 years ago
["1", "2", "3"].map(parseInt)
> [1, NaN, NaN]If I could get just 1 satoshi every time I see this suggestion...
-2017-11-26 22:15:18-- http://www.oreilly.com/design/free/files/2016-design-salary-survey-report.epub
Reusing existing connection to www.oreilly.com:80.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404 Not Found
2017-11-26 22:15:18 ERROR 404: Not Found.Not an expert in batteries but Wikipedia says molten salt batteries provide high amount of power only for a short period of time:
> Once activated, they provide a burst of high power for a short period (a few tens of seconds to 60 minutes or more), with output ranging from watts to kilowatts.
And there will never be especially for web apps because there are no parties interested in this. Look at what happened with HPKP. It looked good on the surface but it turned out that extreme security is a little bit too extreme.
> If you think that taking something that's 80% there and filling in the last 20% for yourself counts as something that's "already" possible, then nothing is new and everything is already possible.
I'm just pointing out that you can already construct a scheme with the same security properties as what you described. If you'd rather wait for some hypothetical standard and implementation that will probably never happen then that's your decision.
> This is really janky and not at all what I'm talking about. What I'm talking about is as simple as what happens now, e.g., "GitLab/Mastodon/Whatever XX.x Released".
Perfect is the enemy of good and "GitLab/Mastodon/Whatever XX.x Released" seems to be just good enough. For paranoid people OpenPGP is there to verify build artifacts.
For the record one can already do it if all resources would use Subresource Integrity. Hashes of leaf resources would be embedded in parent resources up to the root document that you could announce out-of-band (e.g. https://example.com on 23rd of November 2017 has hash 1234566...). Then you'd have a cryptographic proof (like a Merkle tree) that nothing in the page changed.
Yes, but virtually nothing protects against proxying requests. Non-exportable keys protect against using them when the device is powered off.
> Also, if the server is malicious on the first connection, then the server could just not use the webcrypto api to begin with, and just make use a key that the server knows instead.
Agreed, but it's kind of like Trust On First Use. I guess it depends on one's trust model if they consider it a good trade-off.