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Joined 4 months ago
Joined 4 months ago
Are you saying that one can't be "genuinely" intelligent AND one or more of the following:
1) curious about their IQ 2) enjoy timed puzzles 3) want to be part of the Mensa community 4) have a friendly IQ competition with friends 5) be an insecure teenager and take the test for validation
Does "genuine" intelligence preclude all of the above?
Isn't that what most people in democracies think though? When you cast your democratic vote on a candidatr, aren't you hoping to dictate how the whole country should be run?
The only difference between someone like Zuckerberg and your average citizen is that the latter is powerless as an individual.
My point, which admittedly my last message didn't make at all, is that "different shared realities" is not a new thing. The concept is what would have been referred to as "different cultures" throughout most of human history.
Different art, politics, passions, fears, identities, and myths is what cultural variety is about.
If you and I watch the same movies and listen to the same music and follow the same politics and share the same dreams and worries, I don't think it's reasonable to say that we are from different cultures.
What is being described as a "shared reality" in this thread feels more like globalism and less like something obviously positive or worth protecting.
I'm all for more cultural variety as an expression of individual differences.
Different cultures?
Yes, absolutely.
And I think there's a practical extension to my framing that goes beyond semantics.
When there's a seemingly irresolvable conflict between knowledge and belief, i.e. reason says “yes" while the heart says “no”, simply doing the thing a few times will often resolve the tension.
That's the practical advantage I see in my framing:
1) In Gendler's framing, the cerebral and emotional aspects are presented as two different modes of cognition. Belief is thinking, while Alief is just another type of thinking about some other stuff. Taken too far or misinterpreted, this can encourage overanalysis.
2) In my framing, belief is fundamentally about how I operate. So when my reason has exhausted its arguments but I'm still not convinced, as long as my knowledge seems reliable, I know that forcing a behavioral change could be all that's needed to turn me into a believer.
For example, when I walk on my kitchen floor, I don't have to tell myself: "the floor is structurally sound, it's safe to walk on it." I just walk.
The fact that I just walk can be used to infer an infinite number of implied bleiefs that I've never verbalized until this moment. For example, I believe that:
1. The floor can support my weight.
2. The tiles aren't made of toxic materials.
3. I don't pay $$ by the step.
4. Walking on the floor doesn't cause my wife pain.
5. The floor isn't lava.
To refine my definition: a belief is that which systematically and implicitly guides my expectations, reactions, choices, etc.
In her glass skywalk example, Gendler lays out the definitions roughly so:
1. "I know this skywalk is sturdy and safe" = Belief
2. The hesitancy to cross the skywalk = Alief
But to me:
1. "I know this skywalk is sturdy and safe" = knowledge
2. Hesitancy to cross it = actual belief.
That's why in my vocavbulary it's perfectly fine to say: "I know it. But I don't believe it."
Similarly, if someone says, "I totally believe that planes are safe, but I'm terrified of flying", then I will think to myself: "nope; you totally don't believe that planes are safe."
Could conscious life capable of asking such a question evolve in a world with volatile rules?
Also, math spots patterns. It makes sense that we would spot patterns with it. But these patterns could either be just a tiny slice or an extremely high abstraction of reality.
Supposs Earth is visited by a bunch of friendly aliens. They're eager to explore our oceans, and for some reason a magnetic crane is their favorite tool for scientific inquiry. They drop the magnes into the ocean and pull out heaps of metal junk. They conclude that the ocean floor is made up exclusively of metal junk, and then they use the distribution patterns of that junk to come up with coherent explanations for all sorts of observable phenomena.
I guess what I'm saying is: you can only see what you can see. There could be loads that we won't discover any time soon because it's undiscoverable with a math mind.
This helps differentiate between coding as an end and coding as a means to socializing.
"I love and admire my species, living and dead, and am totally dependent on them for my life and well being."
It feels forced. Like the author is trying to convince himself of that belief.
I'm always suspicious when I see these. Does the person genuinely feel grateful, or are they simulating a gratitude that they cannot feel?
Makes me question their emotional sincerity.
Wish I had a definitive answer. I do know from personal experience that when I'm touch typing notes while reading a book or listening to a lecture, my thoughts drift fairly often. (I'm a fairly fast touch typist though, 140+ wpm.) I'm also more likely to be thinking, "damn, that's a lot of notes!" rather than about the material, lol. Whereas while handwriting, I'm heavily engaged with the material, to the point where I lose sight of the fact that I'm in the middle of taking notes.
Oh and because it's so easy to make quick edits while typing, I find it hard to resist the impulse to correct a typo or add an extra word here and there, which further distracts me from the material.
Also, I can touch type for long stretches without the slightest mental fatigue, but I need a tiny mental break after 30-60 seconds of handwritten note taking.
If you can replicate that mental engagement while typing, you'd probably get similar results.
This makes a lot of sense to me in light of what we know about how learning happens. I have never seen any research on brain activity though, and my tutor didn't cite any.
Did you not read the parent before it was deleted?