davexunit

Do you know Abbott and Costello?

I think there are a number of people who mean well that aren't aware that they are creating the means for state control of computing.

Yeah I think the OP is being naive about the risk here.

> Indeed, just now I generated a passkey using free and open source software, and then I emailed it to a friend, and now we can both access the same website using that passkey. At no point did I have to ask anyone for permission, not the website, not the FIDO Alliance; not even my friend, who kindly let me monopolize her time without objection. What’s more, I don’t have to type any numbers by hand to use a passkey; I don’t have to remember any magic words; passkeys just work.

This (before they go on to describe actual passkeys) sounds like object capabilities to me. Capabilities combine designation and authorization so if you don't have it, you can't use it. It's the type of security that we should be moving to.

Passkey attestation sounds like a nightmare for user privacy and for anyone that doesn't use a major corporate operating system.

Are you saying that, aside from carrier grade NATs, dat otherwise achieves 100% direct connections?

There's a distinction to be made between p2p as a network topology and p2p as a redistribution of power and agency. It's true that relays are an unsatisfying fallback to deal with the networks we have, but they still allow for meaningful p2p in sociopolitical terms. Relays that support the spirit of p2p need to be federated, stateless, and end-to-end encrypted.

I don't see how mTLS would work for Radicle or other decentralized systems because, as far as I understand, both parties need to have their certificates signed by a shared root.

Okay, I'm gonna go work on something good. Will return with questions.

Why would I read something you couldn't be bothered to write?

> Not slop, though.

What would you call 2k commits in 2 months by a single committer if not slop?

You're right to be suspicious: it's slop.