cryptbe
Joined 16 years ago
Joined 16 years ago
We're gonna publish more in the coming weeks. Writing these blog posts take time, and we've been busy with another PHP thing.
We've also been working with closely with the Signal Foundation to help them reduce the attack surface.
It's not true that we don't want to make devices more secure. We do and it's why we do this research.
We also do want our name out there because we're having a lot of fun and want to share that with our friends and the rest of the world.
>Just as a reminder for some folks here: During their WeWorm research in July–September 2026, Calif didn't stop at proving RCE to Tencent—they spent an extra week using AI to build a fully functional, self-propagating zero-click worm across three live phones, triggering temporary account bans from Tencent during testing.
Not sure what exactly your point is. The WeWorm demo was done in a controlled environment.
Also we do this for free. We don't charge neither Tencent nor Apple. We don't even take their bounties. Why can't we have some fun?
If you're so upset about how we do it, my suggestion is go find your own bugs.
For the record, this bug has nothing to do with our recent MIE attack [1] [2], which exploited two different kernel bugs. Our bugs are not fixed yet.
[1] https://blog.calif.io/p/first-public-kernel-memory-corruptio...
https://github.com/califio/publications/blob/main/MADBugs/fr...
The script downloads and sets up FreeBSD on QEMU, then runs the exploit.
The exploit is very smart: https://github.com/califio/publications/blob/main/MADBugs/fr.... It basically backdoors sshd.
Check out our blog post for a fun walkthrough: https://blog.calif.io/p/cve-2026-7270-how-i-get-root-on-free...
AI-generated working exploit, write-up and prompts: https://github.com/califio/publications/tree/main/MADBugs/fr...
I've now updated the blog post.
Thanks for releasing a fix!
It was surprising that there wasn't an official release, even though the bug impacts otherwise routine, harmless workflows. The patch itself [1] framed the issue as "hypothetical," so the goal of the blog post was to demonstrate that it is not. I'm glad that you've agreed to release a fix.
[1] https://github.com/gnachman/iTerm2/commit/a9e745993c2e2cbb30...
>The author was able to develop an exploit by prompting an LLM with just the upstream commit
Yes, I was able to do this. I believe anyone watching iTerm2's commits would be able to do this too.
>but I still think this blog post raises the visibility of the vulnerability.
Yes, I wanted to raise the visibility of the vulnerability, and it works!
The author of iTerm2 initially didn’t consider it severe enough to warrant an immediate release, but they now seem to have reconsidered.
It found the bug man. You didn't even read the advisory. It was credited to "Nicholas Carlini using Claude, Anthropic".
That’s fair, but it would be pretty unusual for me to run Git commands in a directory I’m not actively working on. On the other hand, I open files from random folders all the time without really thinking about it, so that scenario feels much more realistic.
We'll publish the technical details of these hacks over the coming weeks. Writing these articles takes time, and we've been busy with a PHP thing [1].
In the meantime, check out The Great Glyph Grift [2] for a glimpse of what can go wrong when iOS parses PDFs.
Just in case you wonder, we've disclosed most of the bugs in these exploit chains to Apple and will disclose the rest. So far in 2026, we've reported close to 100 bugs to Apple. We don't accept Apple bounties, and we're not being paid for this work. We don't sell bugs or exploits, and we have no sponsors funding this research.
We do this because it's fun, intellectually challenging, and we want to help make the iPhone safer. We also have a business to run, so we do need some marketing points.
[1] https://calif.io/php2shell
[2] https://calif.io/research/the-great-glyph-grift