crdrost

So like I don't get to use my degree except to tutor kids and answer physics questions and the like, so indulge me for a second because this doesn't make much sense to me. So like the endgame is to create a new Pryor, OK facility in space, right? It doesn't make sense if we're not shipping something that's about the same as what you can build on Earth.

Epoch.AI says that this facility has 100,000 TPU chips, eats 370 megawatts of electricity, but designed to get rid of up to 480 megawatts of heat. Sun power is 1.36 kW/m^2, which is something like 7 megawatts per football field (assuming ~5000 m^2), but you have to put up something like 3-5x that because solar panels are only 20-30% efficient, right? Assume that you can arrange it so that the solar panels are one side, the radiators on the other, you can maybe get away with only 300-400 football fields maybe? So like 1.5 million m^2 or 1.2 km wide, right? At LEO, 650 km, you have (1.2km)/(650 km) * 180 degrees/pi is 0.11 degrees or 6.6 arcminutes of visual size. The moon is only like 30 arcminutes. And the paper talks about how they're going to not do one big monolithic construction but an oval of fridge-sized objects separated out 2-3 times this size -- so like I don't see how you get another Pryor, OK size data center in LEO without basically having it look like a second, smaller moon flying across the sky 10 times per day.

And if this were a wildly successful idea are we talking about having like 5-10 of them, a few for each big frontier lab? This just sounds like we're talking about the most profound shift to our night skies since we started having to deal with light pollution in our cities.

> Infinite sums are rather inconvenient to calculate in finite time, although this one does converge to a finite value since the terms become exponentially smaller. We could compute until the terms because small enough for an approximation, but that would be unsatisfactory when an exact solution is possible. The key insight is that it doesn’t matter how many times a given item has already been through the loop, only what quality tier it has now.

Isn't the matrix

    M = 1 + L + L^2 + ...

    M = (1 - L)^-1

...? L isn't invertible, but 1 - L is.

It's deeply interesting to me that you decided to override git conflict-resolution (at least in the 90% of cases) in favor of CRDT conflict-resolution. That sort of decision is not uncommon but I was just kinda wondering -- did the CRDT idea come first or did you try a plain-text format for storing the bugs and you ran into certain common workflows where that wasn't ergonomic? (My first guess would maybe just be appending comments to the ticket -- so like if a ticket is a TOML file, you both append a comment at the end, Git immediately screams about what order should those two comments be in -- instead to make that ergonomic within Git's limitations you have to like, represent the comments as a directory tree with no inherent order and UUIDv4 names, and then Git will say "oh you both put blobs in that tree? that's fine. no conflicts," and then you have to order them by (declared-time, UUID) on the client side.)

What's not quite so clear from what I'm skimming is what you did to alleviate Git's postmodernism. What I mean is, Git just holds a bunch of refs like tags and branches and they all deliberately, inherently have equal valence -- this comes from the history of Linux being developed on an email list, there literally is not "one Linux", there is no truth about "what is the Linux v6.18 kernel" but rather there is a big family of v6.18 Linux kernels and anyone who wants to spin up a new one can literally just grab an existing v6.18 kernel and write a patch and bam, you have a new one. It's the blind sages and the elephant, every sage is correct about what the software is, within their limited ability to perceive what the software does. And this like perennially causes problems, right, people use Git for a modernist thing like CI/CD where at most companies "what's running in prod?" is one of those questions that we don't like to say "well it depends on your perspective, there is no one truth..."

Sorry for the long explainer -- I'm just aware that this is a very idiosyncratic way of phrasing the D in DVCS. But it's like, in concrete terms, do you have clients force themselves to declare a certain repo as their origin, and a certain ref on origin is the blessed Git-Bug ref that they have to push from and pull to? And like the add-on that you've crafted just doesn't let you branch the ticket list and all of that? Or -- the opposite -- do you go all-in on the postmodernism and say "no whether some strange-looking functionality is a 'bug', that is a fact that needs to be added to the holistic perspective of the project, and whether that bug is deemed fixed is a similar fact that, like, if you say you fixed the bug in `dev` it might still be not fixed in `uat` or `prod` -- so the bugs need to be stored in the repo that you're versioning anyways. And we use these CRDTs to give you a bird's eye consistent view of a Bunch of repos and all of their current statuses and all that." Or do you take a third direction that's neither purely modernist "this is the truth" nor purely postmodernist "every branch is true".

I just had a much smaller version of this experience yesterday in SF -- the goal was to climb the rocky peak at Corona Heights and then visit the Randall Museum, and as I was coming down Roosevelt not 500 feet from that first stop (around a corner to my right), I realize that I absolutely recognize this neighborhood and in fact I realize that I have been to the Randall before -- or at least I've been in its backyard -- about two years back on a hike up some stairs from the States Street playground with my daughter. The choice of the park was random and then she had wanted to know what was up the stairs so we climbed them and we ended up in the play yard behind there.

But, based on the landmarks I can see and my vague memory that the Randall is "up above us" I turn left on Masonic away from Corona Heights Park, misidentifying the neighboring Buena Vista Park as Corona Heights and orbiting it looking for the museum until we see a prominent staircase with a sign saying "Buena Vista Park" and I realize the extent of my eff-up. I turn away and switch my car's screen from Media to Map -- it doesn't have Corona Heights marked in green as a park but it's reasonably clear where it has to be -- and then unexpectedly I realize I'm in the Castro, randomly?

Punching the thing into GPS takes a second and then the Randall is in fact, in a cul-de-sac which is not what I was expecting -- actually I miss the turn down States Street where the playground was -- and so even though I'm "right next" to the Randall, GPS is like "okay, let's go up the big hill all the way back to where you started turning onto Roosevelt, and we'll try ALL OF THIS over again."

My wife and daughter, needless to say, did not view this as a successful exploration even though I was quite happy with the fact that I'd indeed recognized the neighborhood (and the playground and the museum without seeing either of them).

It's worse than that though -- the things that you are born enjoying, are loud oceanic white-noises and a deep thumping backbeat with occasional muddied high-pitched vocals.

I had a similar dream as a freshman in physics, I had learned that the organ of Corti was a spiral-shaped transducer in a little special bone and I dreamed of snail shells and proving that harmonies formed interesting geometric patterns on the darned thing, and how maybe people who seemed chronically tuneless might be shown to have malformed ear bones -- until I finally got to see images of them in a bio textbook and realized that my dreams had to be crushed, this blobby thing, whatever else you say, is not working geometrically.

So a science of how music works physiologically and psychologically, is able to explain why rock and later certain forms of ambient and trance "felt good" to folks -- it took them right back into the womb: the distortion on the guitars felt like the swishing amniotic fluid, the four-on-the-floor sounded like a heartbeat, the indecipherable high-pitched vocals sounded like Mama's voice peeking through the noise. But beyond that, it's our experience with twanging strings and air blowing through wind instruments and the like, which informs what sounds familiar to our grown ears. And the proof is how robotic and alien pure sine waves sound: this is a part of your organ of Corti complaining, "hey, when these hairs are tickled usually those ones also tickle -- but they're just standing flat, what the hell is going on."

Lots of everyday things tickle the organ of Corti in patterns that resemble a major chord, so that sounds familiar to it. When you play a minor chord you deprive it of stimulation to some of those hairs but stimulate the ones a little more outward, and the organ says "there's something off, this thing is lower than I'd expect" and it's some sociology that you can do to say "when people are hurt they can communicate this most effectively to other pack animals through lower more mournful cries" and so there are semi-biological semi-cultural expectations that govern "lower = sadder" especially at low tempos. But you can do the same in reverse, play a sus4 chord, and it sounds weirdly brighter and you feedback through those semi-biological expectations in reverse, weird but with more energy than expected. But you can also just play minor scales uptempo and then they also change, the minor scale at a higher tempo has somehow more energy and less sadness than the major scale -- indeed rock music is full of minor pentatonic licks that nobody would ever describe as sad or painful or discomforting.

You are correct that the reference is a little obscure -- if my memory serves it's Plato's Phaedrus.

Plato argues, in a book, in the voice of his mentor Socrates, that books will destroy knowledge. And the reason is precisely to do with the thing that Socrates is famous for, his Socratic Method of asking his students (or rival politicians or anyone) questions about what they claimed to know, engaging them in a real discussion where we come to things that we agree about and then build that agreed knowledge-base incrementally. For Socrates, a book could never provide that experience; you cannot ask the book a question.

I mean people do make a living doing it, but my understanding is that it requires a lot of hustle—as a hobbyist you can just take your time and meditate and take a million pictures, but if you're trying to make a living you have to focus on volume, volume, volume... So you have to have a system, this one goes in the cleaner and you are immediately disassembling the next, another is in a tray next to the machine that tells you how fast or slow it's ticking... It is maybe less glamorous than it first sounds.

We must be very clear that this is very light rephrasing.

Just to put it side-by-side in a form that will absolutely not work on mobile but might work if you're on desktop, here's a "two-column form" of an example plagiarism from the thesis:

    [ THESIS ]                                  [SOURCE]
    les équations de la physique engendrent,    les équations de la physique engendrent,
    en plus des solutions correspondant aux     en plus des solutions correspondant aux 
    phénomènes, des solutions sans aucune       phénomènes, des solutions sans aucune
    signification physique directe.             signification physique directe (certaines 
                                                solutions sont rejetées, par exemple,
                                                parce qu'elles violent la causalité 
                                                usuelle). La correspondance entre les 
                                                mathématiques et la physique n'est donc
                                                pas biunivoque et naturelle. Ceci laisse
                                                donc planer un doute sur une sorte
                                Un doute
    très sérieux plane donc sur l'idee d'un
    isomorphisme entre le language mathé-       d'isomorphisme entre le langage (mathé-
    matique et la nature. Quant                 matique) et la nature. [...]
    à l'explication platonicienne de la         L'explication platonicienne de la 
    réussite des mathématiques                  réussite des mathématiques peut être
                                                divisée en deux thèses. La première
                                                pourrait être qualifiée de « platonisme 
                                                faible » (celui qui peut être trouvé dans
                                                des dialogues tels que la République).
    elle consiste à admettre que 
                        les mathématiques       Selon cette conception, les mathématiques
    constituent un langage intermédiaire qui    constituent un langage intermédiaire qui
    permet de passer du monde sensible au monde permet de passer du sensible aux monde
    des Idées, qui forme la réalité profonde    des Idées qui constitue la réalité profonde
    des choses. Si les mathématiques sont       des choses. Les mathématiques sont
    efficaces, dira un platonicien, c'est       efficaces ici 
    parce qu'elles permettent de viser les      parce qu'elles offrent unmoyen de viser les
    structures profondes du monde.              véritables structures du monde.

It's worth pointing out that his M.O. was apparently to sometimes tweak the beginning of a sentence and then word-for-word copy some chunk from this source, some from that source, maybe tweak the ending to create a lead-in to the following sentence... but this is not just "oh some figures of speech lodged in my subconscious" -- this is like "whole sentences were mashed up together."

Just some Google Translate of some of the plagiarized paragraphs, the thesis "The Unity of Physics" has:

> The idea that the diversity of reality is underpinned by a deeper unity is as old as thought itself. Great mythologies recount it, early philosophers affirm it, and modern science has taken up the same agenda by first unifying concepts of motion, matter, and space. Indeed, the desire for intelligibility can arguably not do without the idea of the One. However, simply attributing such a tendency to human nature does not validate its realizations. The proclaimed unity may well prove false—stemming merely from incantation, decree, or fantasy—while exerting a purely dogmatic fascination. Yet, if thought were to discover—amidst the shifting mirrors of phenomena—eternal relationships capable of encapsulating them, one could certainly speak of a joy of the mind. While not necessarily an essential framework of thought, the desire for unity corresponds to a nostalgia, a craving for the absolute, an ontological impatience. Yet, the moment it is expressed, it clashes with the irreducible dispersion of things. From this arises a rift between the desiring mind and the disappointing world. At the close of the century, the increasingly assertive power of physical theories—with their all-encompassing nature and unifying aim—prompts us to examine the foundations of the physicists' quest for unity, to define its limits, and to consider its current prospects.

This is claimed to be a mashup of paragraphs from three different sources, first, the sentence starting "However..." is said to hail from Jean-Michel Besnier's "Theories of Knowledge",

> Could the "monist" tendency inherent in the act of knowing be suggested any more clearly? Yet, simply positing such a tendency within human nature is obviously not enough to validate its realizations. Indeed, that unity may well prove illusory, stemming from sheer fantasy while exerting a purely dogmatic fascination. That is precisely why critical philosophy sets out to distinguish between the scientific and...

Followed by a bit of Camus' "Myth of Sisyphus,"

> If man were to recognize that the universe, too, can love and suffer, he would be reconciled. If thought were to discover, within the shifting mirrors of phenomena, eternal relationships capable of summarizing them—and of summarizing themselves in a single principle—one could speak of a happiness of the spirit of which the myth of the blessed would be but a ludicrous counterfeit. This longing for unity, this craving for the absolute, illustrates the essential movement of the human drama. Yet the fact that this longing exists does not imply that it must be immediately appeased.

The last sentence of Sisyphus was changed except for the "Yet" to what appeared to be an original sentence or two in the thesis, "Yet ... irreducible dispersion of things. From this arises a rift between the desiring mind and the disappointing world" -- but only to immediately jump into a third line from Parrochia's "Grand Revolutions of the 20th Century,"

> The increasingly assertive power of modern physical theories—along with their all-encompassing nature and unifying aim—now enables the scientist to occupy, to some extent, the role held by the philosopher from antiquity through the classical age. This is by no means the least significant consequence of the revolution we have experienced...

My very very initial read of this style, I would almost guess that he paid someone else -- someone who did not have a science education -- to write his thesis for him. And probably if that were true, then he had to provide the sources, "I like this sentence from here, that one from there, you see I highlighted this paragraph of this paper -- I'll highlight and you just paste everything together into one big whole and I'll look through the word processor and tweak a couple of sentence beginnings and endings to make everything look nice for the committee and probably only one person on the committee really reads a bit of it but let's be honest that they're all busy with their own research." With that sort of origin, that's how you get the "blind copying without rephrasing" type of thing (The person who's copying doesn't trust their technical chops to rephrase anything! "What if I choose the wrong word and it has another meaning in science and I embarrass myself?" -- so they go verbatim, "this made sense to someone who was well educated in the sciences, it can't be too embarrassing") with a little bit of tweaks between the chunks.

The really incredible thing about the plagiarism report is the 16 copié-collé/copy-paste sections AFTER this one, where it's just like "Yep, he stole whole pages at a time from his sources in just this way."

If you're a type purist then undefined looks nicer... It'd be like being upset at booleans because things get coerced to them or some 'ish.

No: it's the type that has one inhabitant—it's not that type's fault that it appears as a default argument or var or was left out of JSON... So long as typeof null === "object", null is the absurd one

Yeah so all of personal computing—text editing, SVG antialiasing, etc, fits in 20,000 LOC (VPRI's STEPS project) so a million lines of code is 50 reïnventions of personal computing. BUT: it is unlikely that humans would have solved this problem in 20 kLOC. Sussman said “we really don't know how to compute!” as his talk title and LLMs had to ossify some pre-existing voice as the forever programming habitus and it chose a persona that doesn't know how to program—because we don't —and now we are stuck with it. Claude is our tickets, our implementations, our documentation... And if you tell it “hey the node role should not have those permissions, that should be a service account” it will happily do the right thing, but it has no intrinsic sense of taste and the error message it's trying to clear just says “the node role doesn't have that permission and the system prompt says “keep it short, stupid ” and graybeards might be our last bulwark.

Back when people would read blog posts about the erosion of ownership in the face of intellectual property law, I used to blog about something similar...

Of course the MPAA is against copying, I would say -- the ideal situation for the MPAA would be if when you left the theater, they could just wipe your brain of the memory of the film you just watched. You just remember that you had a fun time with your friends and it was a good movie, but you don't remember any of what happened there. "but those are MY memories" -- no no no we didn't touch YOUR memories, we left your memories just fine -- we only removed a copy of OUR copyrighted content from the world, consistent with our terms of service for the theater. But if you want to experience it again, by all means, come back to watch it again.

"That sounds like it would stifle all cinematic innovation" -- no you don't understand! Our artists are suffering because they don't get the full amount of money they are due because of all of these unlicensed copies moving about the world in peoples' heads. When people are discussing how amazing that movie was, our artists deserve to have them in a controlled cafe attached to the theater where they can control that experience and fully profit off of it. Don't you get it? Bigger financial incentives, bigger payoffs for successful artists -- therefore more artists, and more cinematic innovation! When you play back these unlicensed copies in your "memory" and pirate our works, you're really just contributing to monoculture by not rewarding the people who made your favorite things.

The thing that Rovelli is arguing against (well -- not really arguing -- more, "stubbornly sticking his head in the sand" against) is not really a position that is held by a bunch of religious people trying to create a weird "god-of-the-gaps style argument" as you characterize.

Like, that may have been your experience -- not contradicting you on who you've met and what you've talked with them about etc. ... but what he's talking about is a position argued by a lot of philosophers and including those who have no particular metaphysical commitments.

Rovelli here does a lot worse than Dennett's "quining qualia" paper where he tries to get people to be really specific about "what are these qualia like" and finds that they're so hard to embed in language, to symbolically represent, that maybe he-as-philosopher can discharge his duty to be engaged-with-phenomenalism by just kinda sticking his fingers in his ears and saying "what phenomena?! you haven't clearly defined the phenomena!"

But someone like Searle who has no bones about himself being an atheist and, while he didn't like to describe himself as "materialist" because of the history of that term[1] he would acknowledge that it was close to his basic position. And I want to be clear that he views consciousness as a scientifically solvable problem. He doesn't think we've solved it yet but he thinks the philosophical problems are ultimately tractable and if we solve them and get out of the way you'll get a fine science of consciousness someday. Nevertheless, he's very clear about agreeing with the fact that these qualia are important to the discussion and he would laugh at you for trying to leave them out -- he'd say, now you're trying to make a science of consciousness, by leaving out the consciousness. And of course you don't think there's any science left to be done at that point and "well, it's all deterministic physics, we understand it all, nothing to be done here."

So like if you want to read his take, a book is Freedom and Neurobiology, but for this comment I just want to point out that him simultaneously believing that there are phenomena of experience, and believing that there is no God, are two beliefs that are not uncommon for philosophers to hold together.

1. There's kind of no way to very briefly make the point since you kind of need to be hit in the face with a sledgehammer about it. So Searle views Descartes as erroneously trying to package up the world into two realms -- mind properties or substances on this hand, physical properties or substances on that hand -- and insisting that they can't overlap. And then Descartes' legacy was that you had camps which said 'those mind properties aren't real, only the physical properties' (materialism) and 'those physical properties aren't real, only the mind properties' (idealism) but coming from the same mistaken beginning. Searle would point to the score of a football game and say 'now is that physical because it's represented in terms of lights on the scoreboard, or is it mental because it's represented in terms of the thoughts of the referee, what about all the people on both sides who think the referee made the wrong decision -- something which, remember, by definition the actual referee cannot do; they are the final authority -- and they believe that the score is "really" some other number distinct from the score represented on the lights; and what if none of these people are "right" in the sense that if a perfectly perceptive model referee could have made all of the scoring calls in the game according to the rules on the books, then the score would have actually included an event that everyone watching thought was unambiguously non-scoring but actually it was completely legal and valid. But here I-the-philosopher come into all of this absolute mess and I want to carve out a clear boolean yes/no classification, mental vs physical, material vs ideal, which is it -- the problem, was not that I counted to two distinct possibilities, but that I thought counting those possibilities was a meaningful way to decompose the problem in the first place.

It feels like half the problem in this blog post is dealing with memory access issues induced by QEMU and the VM boundary... it's probably something dumb I'm missing, but if you boot up Ubuntu in Docker, wouldn't the NVIDIA drivers still load? And then you wouldn't have to fight Apple about the memory management because OSX would still own the memory?