coppsilgold

> TCP stack can be fingerprinted

How does that apply to Tor? It uses custom packets. The entry node may be able to obtain a TCP fingerprint but that's all.

It's not surprising that JS would out you, what I am wondering if whether or not volunteering OS information is foolish when it may not be possible to determine without JS.

Why give up information when you don't have to? Some people disable JS at least some of the time.

I believe they used to make the user-agent appear to belong to Windows but then they stopped doing it with the excuse that there are other ways to tell anyway.

The OS doesn't really matter, the amount of entropy it contains is very low. As long as the anonymity set of browser-users is large it's all good. And I believe Tor Browser accomplishes this objective.

Even Tor Browser (/mullvad-browser) gave up trying to obscure the operating system though arguably they shouldn't have. There appear to be too many fingerprinting vectors.

And those types of schemes will never see the light of day, read what they are actually proposing to implement.

Those schemes will never see the light of day, attribution is by design. Without attribution you will just see those tokens sold by the penny.

With ZKP age verification, services will not be able to track you without help from the CA. The CA will not be able to track you without help from the services. Both will contain the necessary information in their databases that when combined deanonymize you. The CA is the central authority/certificate authority.

So you should assume the government can track you, because you should assume both will be streaming those identifiers to it.

Unfortunately ZKP's aren't magic.

When not doing privacy oriented cryptocurrency (cough money laundering cough) with ZKP's, if you really want private verification you are in a position where a single actor can authenticate the entire world and no one will know it happened. And to prevent it you assemble the pieces necessary to deanonymize anyone.

Make no mistake. ZKP age verification, as proposed, will just require multiple parties to collude to figure out your identity.

They can't even implement ZKP for remote attestation due to the auth-the-world problem.

Properly configured (including strict seccomp) bwrap on its own will be sufficient 99% of the time. But ultimately you are at the mercy of the enormous kernel attack surface and the 0days that result from it.

If you do anything valuable and are compromised it may get brought to the attention of whoever organized the automated attack (ex. AI agent doing interesting proprietary work that installed something it shouldn't have, chat logs got uploaded and analyzed) and they will then sell you to someone with the 0days to extract more value from you. Assuming you didn't screw up and leave a back door open somewhere of course.

There is something wrong with your setup.

I just tried:

    bwrap ... --ro-bind /run/user/1000/pipewire-0 /run/user/1000/pipewire-0 ... -- runsc ... do ... -- mpv podcast.mp3

Flawless playback. I think it's a default pipewire configuration.

That's good to hear! Hopefully the passt approach you are pursuing will include the ability to use an existing passt socket and not just launch one for you.

Wayland is tricky because there are memory buffers being shared between the compositor and the client. crosvm (also by google) adopted 2 custom solutions to it of which one got merged into mainline.

Achieving audio passthrough is trivial as it's just a unix socket. `-host-uds=all`

The simplest worthwhile DIY sandbox you can have is to layer two tools: bwrap and gvisor.

    bwrap args -- gvisor args do args -- /path/sandboxee args

bwrap will set up the environment and then gvisor elevates it into a true sandbox.

Standalone gvisor (not the 'do' subcommand) used to be a mess with the OCI json requirement, but recently they began work on presenting their own bwrap interface (likely to pursue AI agent uses) though I wouldn't use it myself yet.

People often look down on gvisor because they think it's some kind of syscall filter, it is not. It can use one of ptrace, seccomp or even KVM to intercept ALL syscalls and service them with it's own logic (which is in Go). Basically it's a VMM and kernel in one.

Identity theft is a thing. And if you gate a desirable commodity behind an identity it will become even more of a thing. There are 100's of millions of identities to steal.