chronofar

More interesting than arguing a jumble of electrochemical reactions have taste? That may seem more readily familiar but is no less strange if you prod at it. Nonetheless it’s difficult to argue either don’t produce output that has qualities of discernment (ie taste).

Perhaps you answered your own question. I think our confusion sometimes stems from assuming those in charge must want to benefit that which they are charged with stewarding.

> And yet people overwhelmingly prefer to work for these non-employees owned companies instead of working in cooperatives - how do you explain that?

Easily: there are far more non-employee owned companies than employee owned. Thus this isn’t a preference at all, it’s merely the availability of the market.

Now you could say that entrepreneurs who start companies have a preference for non-employee owned, thus explaining the aforementioned market allotment. Again that’s pretty easy to explain, because of course such an entrepreneur would give up ownership in an employee-owned arrangement. It’s also just the de facto paradigm most are aware of in news cycles and business schools, and is easier to setup and support.

I think the evidence is that, on the whole (since we’re broadly referring to “people” and obviously there is tremendous diversity contained within), people do not hate each other, they hate the “other” team (whatever that may be). We’re wired for in/out group think to such a high degree that it’s incredibly easy to dial in division and purpose it to some end.

Two individuals in a room are more likely to find common ground than hate until you bring up the right sport they happen to be on opposing teams for.

> but regulation and liability has made it impractical to develop a modern engine.

Can you go into more detail about this? What regulation/liability specifically has stifled modern engine development? And is the answer deregulation? Or more carefully applied regulation of a different sort?

I think specifics are critically important for this kind of thing. General rhetoric is often “too much regulation” or “not enough regulation,” but what we usually want is “the correct regulation to align incentives,” which is often different for different cases.

I’m at the other end, I think the show suffered due to its insistence on querulous characters as a means to pathos, but was kept afloat by its wit and humor (much of it indeed “wacky”). That is of course very much a personal preference thing, but I couldn’t connect with much of the darker side of the show, even while I admired much of its execution.

As others have said though, it definitely gets better as the seasons roll on, along both the humor and drama fronts. The final season has many of the funniest and most poignant moments of the show.

Sure, none of what you said there would lead to the conclusion that the "experience is not something that really happens," though it's also possible there's a just a failure of communication here and I'm not understanding what you meant.

Completely sidesteps which question?

It answers very clearly these questions posed by the person I was responding to:

> why I am currently occupying the body that I am as an observer, and not another one, or perhaps even none.

It definitely does not answer the "hard" problem of consciousness, which is what you're alluding to and which I specifically and explicitly said it didn't answer.

The experience is internal, the body (the limb that's missing) is external to the experience. The confabulatory experience of "I don't want to move" is an internal experience and cannot itself be an illusion, it's simply an incorrect assessment of the actual state of the body.

Materialism, which by my reading has the most evidence going for it, solves these particular questions rather easily. Your experience as an observer is the result of your brain. It's not another one or none b/c those aren't your particular brains.

This doesn't solve the "hard" problem, it's still quite mysterious how exactly and at what point neuronal mappings become sentient, but it does leave you without having to wonder the particular questions you asked there.

> So, they think they are having one experience, but they are wrong about their own internal experience: in fact, they are not moving that limb because they can't.

I think it's rather the opposite, they aren't wrong about their internal experience, it's just that their internal experience doesn't match the objective reality of their body (which in this sense is external).

I think it is indeed entirely possible that our self-model can fool us about the realities of various situations, even those with our own body/emotions/etc, but I'm not sure how one could then derive the conclusion that the experience doesn't exist. It would just be instead that the experience is rather inaccurate/confabulated.

> not because it "thinks" but because the way it's wired it's (nearly - barring solar radiation, I suppose, which incidentally also goes for cells) inevitable that it will react to a stimulus in a predefined way (even though the way cells react to stimuli is far more advanced than a CPU)

I think these are likely different only by way of their level of complexity. We simply substitute a word like "think" when the reactions to stimuli are far too complex and numerous for us to track fully. But ultimately said "thinking" is made up to many, many cells following those same stimulus/reaction patterns.

I don't think they're as small as you're saying. There have been multiple well documented incidents with 737 MAX that have not been with the A320. Maybe you think it's small enough to not worry about, said incidents are enough for me to want to avoid that aircraft entirely. Absolute risk is certainly still low, but I'll take the safer in comparative risk any day there.

Paying attention to planes and risks of other forms of transport are not mutually exclusive.