alphager

Zero Trust is expensive to implement and the business people hear "at the end, the systems will ideally work as good as before".

It will take a few bankruptcies until security is taken seriously.

1 already exists. You don't check the ctlogs; the ctlogs as their signed timestamp to the certificates. All you need to verify that a certificate has been published is to verify the timestamp signatures.

The hacker can remain anonymous, the publisher is easily sued.

But legally pretty perilous regarding copyright and personality rights.

There is zero mechanism by which the ICC can indict Trump. Its jurisdiction is only over signature countries and their territories; the US is not a signatory country.

FYI: you can turn off video content in the family account settings (not the parental settings).

You are on a site that's part of the SV culture. The culture that approves if everything not explicitly lillegal done to increase the ROI on startups. The culture that celebrates negative externalities as "disruption".

Have you had recent experiences? I thought the same until I tried it out, on decision stable no less. The driver support nowadays is incredibly good on Linux (my desktop Bluetooth didn't work under Windows with official drivers; just works without any tinkering under Linux).

Truenas core is BSD, not GPL.

France24 is a reliable news channel based in France.

They didn't run over BT. BT is used to initiate communication and share the password to a wifi-network. It then uses that Wi-Fi network for most communication, keeping the BT channel strictly for telephony.

Tell me about it! We've got slightly under 10'000 distinct software assets we are trying to catalogue. There are now a handful of vendors claiming to be able to scan for crypto, but they all suck.

I work as a security architect in a major European company. We're currently demanding a full cryptographic inventory of every new product purchased or service built in-house and will start demanding PQC in 2028.

Not because we expect a workable quantum computer by 2030 (current estimates are around 2035-2040), but because stuff survives for decades in large enterprises (especially if it touches hardware in any way. Think OT, think controllers for all kinds of machines).

Now that PQC is standardized, there's no gain not to demand it (it's basically a demand to use a current openSSL/libreSSL/$library), but not demanding it now will cause a major headache once/if quantum computers work.

TLS connection speed matter only for a very tiny niche of applications; those will choose according to their needs. For the general case, it just doesn't matter.

If your threat model includes store-now-decrypt-later, you should have been demanding PQC for years.

The check for citizenship is not done at the polling place; it's done at the time of voter registration with plenty of accepted IDs.

ZFS on Linux works great, but with most distributions, it will compile the kernel module on device upon installation. Only Ubuntu distributes binaries.

As a consequence, you don't necessarily want a rolling distro, as the ZFS module can get out of sync with the kernel.

ZFS itself is build for both BSD and Linux from the same source, so there's feature parity there.