aleksejs
Joined 7 years ago
Joined 7 years ago
The other articles you've linked also describe attacks against accounts that allow non-passkey logins, or attacks that require a compromised browser.
> Depending on which multi factor method the account uses, the victim sees a matching fake screen, whether a one time code prompt, an authenticator app number match, or an SMS page.
The only sense in which passkeys have anything to do with this at all is that the attackers used the word "passkey" in their emails. When a phishing campaign with the subject line "Your Mailbox is Full, Log In to Fix Now!" succeeds, that does not demonstrate an interesting vulnerability inherent to your mail server's mailbox size limits.
If you presume bad faith on the part of basically the entire WebAuthn implementer community, how does this help?
The consumer passkey authenticator implementations of today do not provide attestations, passkey relying parties do not consume them, and both would need to intentionally ship changes to enact the scenario you're worried about. If you're worried about both of these colluding to lock you out of your accounts, it seems naive to think that changes to an (intentionally malleable, extensible) spec will protect you.
Can you walk me through how that would work?
But I'm not convinced anymore that the actual typing experience is any good. Way before that exciting section, there's a video where somebody takes two full seconds to type "Hey bro you" on this phone's keyboard. I tried: in the same amount of time, I can type "Hey bro you mean everything to me" on my Pixel's default keyboard.
(per section 1.6 of USPS DMM 133 at https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/133.htm)
https://repebble.com/