abofh

Another is that technology ends up advancing so fast that the odds of a species blowing themselves up before they get beyond the stars approaches one.

That is not what was written; what was described was anthropic losing control over their cursor account - perhaps a key compromise, developer laptop compromise, or a fault in cursor, but of the three, the language suggests the first two.

Which reads like the CA key got compromised - the customer's keys are fine

When they confuse the CA issue and the PHP issue in the opening paragraph, I have a hard time trusting their analysis

Stolen suggests they got no value from the society they harmed, like a marketplace.

Nobody is stealing from billionaires.

Me too, just add my root and you'll never be warned again!

You have access to unlimited free certificates based on DNS delegation through this method, but need more.

It might be useful to explain why this adds value that another CA can't

Because you inherited it from someone who built it before that was a thing, and discovered it when you went serverless.

How'd I guess on the article itself?

> The Huggingface Attack revealed that making blanket statements like this is difficult and requires quite a bit of manual labor

It requires humans to verify what agents have done.

Weird

I mean basically that. If you hit a corporate IP, unless they have flow level logging or you have very extensive timestamps, then the game ends, company says they've enacted new training or controls, but they can't identify a specific person and it's not their fault.

Essentially - this is not a suggestion.

Residential ip's map to a specific person, and it's a lot harder for them to deflect and say I'm not responsible for my own Internet connection

Because it's not worth it financially. After icann is the tld registrar, and after that above. So, if anyone is destroying it, it's not the registrar, it's the tld.

Dev/shm is used to materialize them, and then you have the ability to isolate the downstream code you might use from accessing it by dropping permissions or sandboxing it away from a file. You cannot really hide your environment from anything in process, since it's such a low level construct.

Thus it's easier to leak environment unintentionally, leaking file contents takes effort.

Yes, gcp has volumes of available accurate documentation, but it's almost entirely incomprehensible and bizarrely undiscoverable by search

Do they have SSL updates yet? Signing is great, but using https means not fighting firewalls to start a job

Youre required to have a policy. That policy may be throwing bananas at the wall, but if it's documented and you follow it, you're compliant with policy.

You run ssh?