U2EF1

They could steal a smaller cannon first and use that on any chains or locks.

Join the rest of us in post-1950's complexity theory. We can use register machines now. Or you can bust out the big bucks and buy a RASP.

LE by default successfully ran 2 months prior. 2 months and 5 years are two completely different worlds in terms of bit rot. That and there are many generic tutorials and scripts and knowledgeable devs for configuring LE fresh.

It's all just theories. But yes the article is basically summarizing a new paper/model. Most likely: the model is incorrect in some ways. But maybe useful in others.

I mean yeah that's basically what high compression solutions like paq have done, depending on the compression level desired apply increasingly speculative and computationally intensive models to the block and pick whichever one worked the best.

But what if they stole it for their 7 year old cancer ridden son, who only wants to be happy once before he dies.

[citation needed]

So he really means they were "waiting for IO" bound.

C has some of the best static analysis and debugging tools of any language, but all of that's worthless if you don't use them. Doubly so if you specifically handicap those tools and write your own obfuscated allocation scheme. Heartbleed was less an indictment against C and more an indictment against shitty code.

You could run something like TAILS in a VM or docker, I guess.

Worse, overwriting SSD's with random data would halve their lifespan, and some SSD's don't even allow you to control where exactly you are writing to. Better to just never write unencrypted data to the drive at all.

In C, then translate that to Go of course ;)

The only real surprise is that Salesforce wasn't better able to obscure it. Still, they weren't giving out a million dollars for a days work.

wat

empty dict: {:} empty set: {}

Ah, the road not taken.