SimingtonFCC
Joined 3 years ago
Joined 3 years ago
Just a reminder: As fun as discussing this in here with you is, the best way to influence what the FCC ends up doing is to file an official comment by September 25th at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/docket-detail/23-239 . Click to file either an ‘express’ comment (type into a textbox) or a ‘standard’ comment (upload a PDF). The FCC is required to address your arguments when it issues its final rules. All options are on the table, so don’t hold back, but do make your arguments as clear as possible so even lawyers can understand them. If you have a qualification (line of work, special degree, years of experience, etc.) that would bolster the credibility of your official comment, be sure to mention that, but the only necessary qualification is being an interested member of the public.
Finally, I'd like to extend a special thanks to dang and the rest of the HN team for their help putting this together. They have been a pleasure to work with.
The FCC hasn't traditionally been a cybersecurity agency and will, most likely, never really be one; however, we can certainly do things through rules to empower experts, the public, and the agencies with cybersecurity expertise. If that one thing is all you ever did at the FCC, sounds like the public owes you a big debt of gratitude.
it would be really useful if there were a TLDR version
I agree; I'm hoping that the tech press takes up this topic, but an "official" one would make engagement much faster.
I think the labeling should be simple - like a small discrete set of classes for compliance that can be extended over time with further rules. So 20 years security updates is “platinum” 10 years is “gold” 5 is “silver” or something. Then the classes of label can accrete meaning over time as you enhance your proposals.
This is how I'm thinking about it too -- not just for support term, but for all kinds of things, FOSS firmware in escrow, bankruptcy transition plan, responsibility to publish and implement fixes from public databases -- there's so much that might go into each tier, and while I have my own ideas, it would be great to see the tech community take up these questions.
in some ways a way to work best is right here in the HN comments and then lifting material up into your direct work via the proposal and statement
Also true, and my team will be doing a detailed after-action on this thread once it winds down.
To that end maybe reaching out earlier in the process to get feedback would work
That's one to grow on for next time. The good news is that the final rule (I'd expect end of Q2 2024) will also be subject to notice-and-comment.
Seriously, a huge thank you for your close engagement. I'm really excited about what the tech world can bring to this high-level proposal.
The FCC conducts notice-and-comment rulemaking and is accountable to a public interest standard. Obviously the public interest can be hard to define, but at minimum, if reasonable comments on the record raise issues that we are clearly ignoring, this is likely to emerge in item debate, dissenting statements, and the press. In fact, the courts can go as far as overturning a rule if the FCC failed to adequately address arguments made on the record during the rulemaking process. A lot of our rulemaking is technical and not of general interest, but the public has the right to comment on all of it.
In this particular case, I think the much of the relevant experience and expertise resides with the public more than the federal government. A lot of tech workers are very upset with the current state of IoT security and with the US Government's actions or lack thereof, so if we get a lot of comments on the records about specifics, those will be hard to brush off.
Link for general reference: https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/rulemaking-process
I sort of want both. Official commentary moves the needle, but selfishly, I love the thread comments. People tell you what they really think, and sometimes go into a lot of detail as to why. It's an education for me.
I think IoT security is a huge issue, and I think that the solution could be that there are standard, open-source, open-license, free-to-use packages; maybe written in languages like C, that could be offered to the industry. These could enforce low-level compliance with security standards.
"Universal basic security" would probably be a major field of policy approach if we found ourselves with some huge disaster requiring a regulatory response. It's at least worth thinking about now, even if it goes beyond the scope of what the immediate regs can do.