Mvandenbergh
Joined 15 years ago
Joined 15 years ago
They did so for political and ideological reasons that I think are pretty clear to anyone who follows European politics.
Had those same political stakeholders had more direct executive control of a single national electricity system, they would have done the same thing and for the same reasons.
Yes, of course a vertically integrated system optimising for efficiency would never have made these choices but the same political decision makers who shut down Germany's nuclear fleet would never have permitted such an integrated system to operate in such an efficient way if it meant not building wind assets.
We can see the impact of a different political direction in the French electricity system, which despite being structurally similar to the decision making of the German system is in practice much more centrally directed and which despite absurd attempts to sabotage it from within France and within the EC continues to operate in a much more optimal way.
It doesn't do this through formal centralisation and integration but by the careful design of grid codes and subsidy regimes to avoid these absurdities.
The issue is that the physical reality of the network and the location of generators and loads is fixed at time of [re-]dispatch. Regardless of how you reconfigure the dispatch mechanism, there is energy that cannot be moved through the network from the wind in the North to the load centres in the South. The only way to avoid that physical reality is to either massively increase the N-S transmission capacity or to put generation capacity closer to load.
Once these generators have been placed where they are and pending extremely challenging network expansion being realised, it will always be the case that some party or set of parties bears the cost of the constraint.
If you moved the ownership and control of the transmission network and all generators into a single operator that was responsible for optimising its operation in near-real-time and that bore all the costs within a single accounting perimeter, it would do more or less what the the existing market based mechanism does: turn off the wind generators and instruct the thermal plants in the South to run instead.
Yes, it's true that in that case there would not be a "market price" paid to wind turbines that actually cannot run, nor would there be a higher re-dispatch price paid to the thermal generator. However the total system cost would still be the same. Even though the wind turbines would "lose" money because they can't run and the thermal plant wouldn't receive its market price for relieving the congestion.
Of course you could argue that this efficient single operator simply wouldn't have built the wind assets in the first place in a location where they often couldn't run but that assumes that the same policy makers who created the current outcome wouldn't have engineered the exact same outcome through the direct control they presumably would have had of the integrated operator. I will note that many American utilities actually are vertically integrated like this (banned in the EU under the Third Energy Package) and they build in the exact same pattern and bear the constraint costs internally.
That could have been prevented by simply not permitting connections in certain parts of the network. Yes, theoretically it could also have been prevented by forcing generators to directly bear re-dispatch costs which would have led developers to build a different set of generating assets. This would have been a different set of market mechanisms.
However, if generation decisions had been made centrally, they would have been made by the same system operators, regulators, and governments that mandated the construction of the current system and they would have therefore built the same system more or less. Do you really think that if e.g. Germany or the GB network had been centrally planned by their respective government mandated regulators and system operators, they wouldn't have put all those windfarms exactly where the market-led model we actually have has put them?
I don't recall that they were against (in fact they were in favour) of the removal of the 30% tax rules intended to attract expats in, among other things, tech businesses. I don't recall that they've ever done or said anything to make the country a more attractive place to start or grow a business of any kind, let alone the kind of venture capital funded technology startups that would allow us to move a substantial fraction of our tech consumption to homegrown alternatives.
Maybe they're at least in favour of permitting for data centres so that we can at least host our own services... oh wait, they don't want those either.
The study is here: https://ijbnpa.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12966-024...
The data was collected during the 2018/2019 academic year and then during the 2019/2020 academic year (but before the Covid school closures).
First, some context: -The original ULEZ, which the referenced study looked at covers central London and should not be confused with the much larger recently expanded ULEZ which covers the whole city. Nor should it be confused with the much smaller congestion charging zone or the larger and older Low Emission Zone which covers freight vehicles. -The ULEZ rules are designed around penalising the driving of the oldest and most polluting vehicles only. In 2019 this was 80% of cars, the expanded ULEZ has overall vehicle compliance of 95%+.
As as result of the second point, it would not be expected that it would have a substantial effect on the number of vehicle journeys since 80% of passenger cars in the zone were already compliant anyway, therefore any effect at all is actually surprising. The paper notes a drop of 9% in total vehicle counts.
"Four in 10 London children stopped driving and started walking to school a year after the city's clean air zone went into effect."
This little quote heads the article. It seems like quite a result, right?
It isn't.
Let's look at the baselines here, something which immediately anyone who lives in London would be suspicious about because like me their first question would be: "who was driving their kids to school in central London in 2019? Are there enough for there to be four in ten at baseline to switch?". It turns out not many people do, and no.
Let's look at table 2 from the paper: (there were about 1000 kids in both the Luton and London samples) At baseline, 856 kids in London travelled using active modes and 105 using inactive modes In Luton that was 599 and 364 respectively
So first, we can say that "four in ten children" has to be interpreted pretty carefully here since 85% of kids were already walking to school (note that if they just took the bus the whole way this also counted as walking).
At most, we must be talking about changes to the minority of kids who weren't using active travel before, in other words maybe it's that "Four in 10 London children (of the minority who were being driven) started walking to school.
But, if we look at the changes, that doesn't quite stack up either.
In London: 47 kids switched from active to inactive (all measured based on travel "today" and in many cases there will be variation in modes across days) 44 switched from inactive to active 61 inactive/inactive 809 active/active
In Luton:
124 active/inactive 74 inactive/active 290 inactive/inactive 475 active/active
It doesn't look like, ignoring the Luton control for the moment, there was any modal shift at all for London!
Luton has proportionally shifted away from active transport and only in relative terms to the control has there been a modal shift.
This is already a much less positive message. "Kids in general less likely to walk to school, except in London where (potentially due to a low emissions zone) their behaviour didn't change." Where's my four in 10 gone?
The "four in 10" comes from the 44 kids who were inactive in the first sample but active in the second (out of 105 total inactive in first sample). Of course that is a much larger % of children from that group who switched in that direction than the 47 who switched the other way from much larger number of first sample actives. If your transition probabilities from A to B are much higher than B to A, but B is much larger group, you can end up in this situation here where you have impressive sounding % changes which nonetheless mean nothing and don't change the population behaviour at all.
It's a very fine thing, no doubt, to run multilevel binomial logistic regression models on data and come up with statistically significant odds ratios but I don't think these results remotely justify the news article headline and subhead.
Do you mean Drax? That's nowhere near London.
>And those subsidies exist because of fossil fuel industry lobbying and very willing politicians
Why would the fossil fuel industry lobby in favour of wood-chip biomass?
The electricity system has done most of its decarbonising under either the coalition or Conservative governments, they used quite a lot of the machinery (the CfDs, capacity market, etc) setup at the end of the last Labour government but it has been the subsequent governments that have chose the annual budgets for the auctions as well as setting up the carbon budget system.
There have been only two things that I would regard as material mistakes in this time:
First, not adjusting the max strike price for offshore wind in AR5.
Second, changing the planning rules to make it very hard to build onshore wind.
Everything else, including things like the offshore bootstraps / HND which are now receiving FID (like EGL2 which was just approved), the upcoming decision on zonal pricing, and most of all the massive buildout of solar and offshore wind generation and battery storage has happened under previous governments.
It's arguably the only area of policy which has gone quite well over the last decade, so I'm intrigued which damage you have in mind.
I wouldn't want to make that bet for an encyclopaedia published in 2027 though.
In a well insulated property, the greater efficiency from operating at low output temperatures outweighs the additional heat loss from no / a low overnight set-back. In a poorly insulated property, the optimum set-back is higher and the efficiency at that optimum point is also much lower because the heat pump has to operate at higher temperature in order to ramp up the temperature.
I don't know if they are available in North America, but in the UK we have hybrid systems available that use heat pumps for 80% of the annual heat load and gas for peaking / ramping. OpenTherm gas boilers can be retrofitted to be controlled in this way so you only add the heat pump. An air source heat pump driving a hydronic / radiator system in this climate can serve 80% of the annual load with a unit sized at 55% of peak heat load. Different climates will have slightly different numbers but it shows the power of a hybrid system as you save a lot on HP capex and also maintain redundancy.
The advantage of this system is that the failure-mode of an incorrectly sized system is an efficiency penalty rather than not being warm enough, the same as an incorrectly commissioned or sized gas system. (Most gas systems are not optimally sized or configured and are delivering 5% to 10% less efficiency than they could).
I don't know if these systems are available in ducted air configuration for the US market though.
Same reason, all infrastructure was either already there or usable after (the Olympic stadium was sold to a football team).
Generally the larger a city is, the better able it is to host an event like this for obvious reasons.
(the specific case of very little consumption but panels and inverters going full tilt doesn't work as this would lead to the frequency rapidly increasing, exceeding inverter set points and the local grid collapsing with all the inverter tripping off. The danger scenario is closely matched load and generation, like a real grid)