JackRabbitSlim
Joined 7 years ago
Joined 7 years ago
The managed hosts and/or their tools probably helped negate damage/resolve issues quicker. However I think that the idea that "all you need is a couple of dozen lines of yaml and a managed provider" is exactly why it's headed down a similar path.
For a real world examples just look at every improperly configured S3 bucket leaking data. Every private key accidentally posted to github from a careless 'git add -a'. Every API that doesn't properly check auth. None of these are within the purview of a managed hosts responsibility.
I'm not even against K8 in any of this. Just making the observation that - like PHP - it is empowering entire groups of people to do things they otherwise wouldn't be able to do.
And like PHP, it will be criticised with the power of hind sight but will continue to be used and power vast swaths of the internet.
“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”
Youtube et al certainly encourage the free and public flow of traffic. Their business model depends on it. So their responsibility to the public would seem to obviously overshadow the perceived protections as a "private company".
I was also a child of the 80's
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf
tl;dr The signal from a DVI cable can be detected but at much more reduced ranges. See also; RAGEMASTER (Snowden leak) a range extending implant for video cables.
I noticed you said "meaningful" impact and not "no impact". If your optimizing this seems like the best of both worlds in the slight increase of conversion and the security of verified email?
Revenue driven design will win every time.
Now look at this app I can write in 30 lines of code with this framework! Oh and 500 lines of yaml across 2 dozen files but look the "code" is so sleek and sexy.
Joking aside I think he could have at least mentioned the difference between required complexity and unneeded complexity. Ironically it seems to spawn from attempts to reduce the first type of required complexity in a lot of cases.
I can verify the OS install media with trusted publishes using signing keys and PKI. I can't do a god damn thing about the cheap, back-doored PCI controller from China.
What protection does secure boot really offer the end user at that point? The PCI controller is in place to just pass the right signatures to secure boot or just wait until after the secure boot checks so it's not helping with bad hardware. I already verified the OS media at install, so its not super useful there either. Did my boot code change? How would I know? Did the bad PCI controller fake it? Do I have any additional trust in my system? I can't go probing the system to try to find out.
A black box with zero control told you you were safe and there is no way to look at or modify the system now so you can trust it. Your hardware was never on a TAO workbench. Who doesn't feel safer?
That "very small set of primitives" is enough to build the cloud vendors themselves so how exactly is that a limiting factor?
If I seem overtly hostile I don't mean it that way. I am just genuinely curious for an extended explanation. In it's current form it sounds down right marketing tautology to my ears.