ItsMonkk
Joined 5 years ago
Joined 5 years ago
But a UBI funded through an LVT is much better than that. An LVT is a non-distortionary tax. This means that increasing the tax does not change behavior. But it is not only non-distortionary, it also reduces the ability to speculate as land tax rises. This causes the LVT to be a net-good tax, in much the same way that not taxing carbon is a subsidy to those who burn carbon. The lack of an LVT is a subsidy to the owner of the land. Ending rent-seeking will thus cause the economy to grow. This would result in deflation, and so the UBI is necessary to bring us back to our inflationary target.
The article shows a good example where this will have a massive impact to the economy, even if it is not true in most of the world. That place is South Korea, where roughly 50% of the population lives in the Seoul Capital Area, which continues to grow every year. This has caused significant economic damage, as young people are unable to afford to have both families and a place to live in Seoul, but they must live there in order to have a job. They can simply not afford to live outside of Seoul, where housing is less, but wages are much less.
If they were to enact an LVT with a UBI(or as Georgists call it, Citizen's Dividend) then the population of Seoul that would prefer to move out into cities and towns throughout SK would finally be able to afford to do so. They would only need to be able to find a job that allowed them to live a lifestyle that they preferred.
That's what great about a policy that does not advocate for any particular out-come, but about reaching equilibrium economic states. For places that have to low density, it incentivizes density. For places that have to high density, it incentives spreading.
Thus there is no single rental price, merely an initial unknown quality rental price, that as a tenant gets to know the quality of the landlord, and the landlord gets to know the tenant, will resolve to a price that is different for every combination. There will be a distribution according to all of these factors.
These are market rents. LVT will not change them.
What we need is a system that subsidizes the value created by the inventor, without any restrictions for the rest of society. Without any restrictions will allow every innovation to maximize the value that it is able to create. Currently an innovation can be hampered because the person who created that innovation is not the one best able to utilize that innovation.
One way to accomplish this is through an Innovation Prize Model while Patents and Copyrights be abolished. The way it would work is that once you've come up with some innovation, you have a choice. You can either keep it secret, or you can reveal the secret. If you reveal the secret, the government could grant you a 30 year bond based on the value of this innovation. The bond will have a minimum value, and if it's discovered within the 30 year window that the innovation is more valuable than previously suspected, value will be added to that bond. You would then have an option, to keep the bond for the 30 years, or you could sell a portion of this bond to others to instantly get cash. There could be a market for these that made it easy to trade and discover expected values.
It's clear from the dead-weight loss portion that overall value will be much higher than the existing scenario, so this payment will be much higher than any profits that copyright holders currently accrue.
If we begin doing this, and as a result, none of the academics can get a job as they are all filled by the 'embedded' students, I don't mind seeing how that shifts everything.
> allow companies to direct the research towards their ends
So long as they hit the requirements to reward the prize, I don't much care what else the students are driven to do. One might ask how does this differ from when a company hires a fresh graduate? In fact, I wouldn't mind also applying this system to those that have degrees, and are trying to advance in their careers.
My only concern is that the students would then be able to be hire-able by other companies in their field. If that answer is mostly yes, the system is working as intended. If it's not, the requirements would be raised until they are.
Instead of getting student loans and going to college for 4 years where you don't accomplish much, companies should directly offer high school students 4 year full paid internships. At the end the student needs to go through a test from an expert in that field, possibly a professor lead examination, and to the degree that they pass the company and student share in a large prize. If they pass that test, they officially get the degree.
You're trying to give individual researchers, who believe they have a chance at a new strategy, to take their new strategy and sell equity to the prize they might win to a new firm.
With a prize based approach, what you want is for researchers to make small targetted gambles early in their career, earn their prize profits from those gambles, and work their way up into bigger gambles. There's nothing crazy about this scheme, it's how businesses have formed for hundreds of years. If a company wants to buy equity in the prizes of an independent researcher, I see no issue with this.
> then why would this model not be possible in a government office
I see no issue with governmental workers, or those from a university medial research center, or any other persons who can achieve the results from receiving this prize.
> someone needs to pay for all of the trials that don't work
The researchers. They are the one taking the risk. They are the one who would get the rewards. Skin in the game.
> With a public funding scheme, the benefit analysis could be based on public health interests.
Yes, we should directly pay the organization, or persons, based on the value they generate from their own. The bigger the public health interest, the more they should be paid. Right now we give a tiny piece to these people, and thus harm our incentives. Fully fund the results. It's risk-free.
Since the people with the money don't understand the science, these possibilities must then be assessed by bureaucrats, and this causes our best to spend half of their time writing proposals instead of working and researching. A complete waste of time. Let the people who know the most about their subject freedom to take risks, and then they are given the spoils of their rewards if they are proven correct.
Prizes are much more efficient than grants. Prizes should be given to academics according to the value they produced. I have no issue if the academics choose to spend some of the windfall profits of their prizes on trials.
This is a much better compromise. The company will end up with more money(and faster!) as a result of this prize than under a patent system - since the patent system induces dead-weight losses, and the government will end up with more lives saved.
Signs are low cap-ex but high op-ex technique that harms overall safety and causes thousands of deaths per year.