HHad3
Joined 9 years ago
Joined 9 years ago
> BitLocker hashes the user-specified personal identification number (PIN) by using SHA-256, and the first 160 bits of the hash are used as authorization data sent to the TPM to seal the volume master key.
So what's actually happening is that the PIN is used to derive an authValue passed to the TPM, which compares it to the expected value, and can trigger lockout on too many mismatches.
I can't find specifics to how Windows configures the TPM wrt. lockout, but the mechanism described in the article appeared fishy to me, and contradicts official docs. It also would not make sense that TPM+PIN was known to be safe against bus sniffing attacks if it would still reveal all data required to brute-force the PIN.
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating...
You of course need people to maintain it -- the $300k turnkey solution might be the better option depending on current staff.
BrowserEngineKit is a thin wrapper over XPC and iOS' extension system. The system would be so much better to develop for if XPC was an open API, and JIT for isolated sub-processes was permitted without Apple's blessing.
* Messengers could have separate sub-processes for preprocessing untrusted inputs -- iMessage already does this, third-party messengers are single-process and cannot.
* Applications could isolate unstable components for better user experience and crash recovery.
* Emulators, e.g. for retro systems, would benefit from speedy emulation.
* WASM would become useful in iOS.
* Browser could use XPC without special-purpose API wrappers such as BrowserEngineKit.
But alas, all of this would make it easier to load code that runs at native speed into an iOS app after a store review happened, and as we all know that'll be the end of the world.
This still effectively prevents Apple from adding backdoor to be installed on phones the user can no longer access.
I found no way to sandbox things beyond the sandboxes provided by iOS extension points (which are mostly XPC under the hood, but with no control options for the app).
Apple makes heavy use of XPC to sandbox iMessage services, but on iOS that remains an Apple-only feature.
You could as well have triggered a bug in some LaTeX engine that happened to be configured to allow arbitrary shell command execution.
Another strategy to defend against these issue you describe would be to not let developers access raw production data in the first place, but always anonymize it first, or remove internet access from machines accessing production data. (How sensitive is the data in your users table? Could a developer's test script accidentally send emails to your live users?)
You can also generate a custom installation medium or cloud image that pulls config from your trusted machines if you cannot use out-of-band provisioning.
You can also securely use the insecure maintenance mode when there is a firewall in front of the machine, which prevents access by non-administrator clients to the API ports on IP level.
I'm not a fan of Talos booting into insecure maintenance mode without config w/o prompting for at least a PIN displayed on-screen, but the problem you're describing in no way prevents production use.
I did not immediately see any private entitlements that restrict access to this API, nor is msdos.fs signed with special entitlements on my machine. Chances are this API works for any filesystem by dropping an appex into /Library/Filesystems. Looking forward to this being documented and made public eventually.
[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/msdosfs/blob/423d...
Is there a policy on using portrait photos of oneself at your company? Then the profile photos should indeed be changed, because they're not photos of oneself, but drawings of cartoonish animals.
Otherwise there is no issue here but your understanding of subcultures and these three members of your team. I invite you to talk to them directly, mention the sex thing, and watch hilarity ensue.
> I've tried to bring this up with management but have been told they don't see any issues and I should drop it.
They probably value their contribution to the company over potential misunderstandings should these developers come into contact with customers via Teams. Management might not know what furries are. They might have googled it and found it to be benign. They also might have reacted that way due to the way you presented the issue, or interact with management or your team in general. It's impossible to tell from your post alone.
> Am I overreacting here?
Yes, but that is understandable if you believe that it's a sex thing.
> Is this normal in a corporate environment? I get that with remote work, things have become more casual, but not too sure if this is too far.
Depends on the company. Some may have policies on profile pictures, none of those will explicitly ban furry avatar pictures.
Good luck with the younger generation, Gigachad!
The env and more importantly what populates it should be secure, but security works best in layers. Sanitizing the env after loading it is a nicer middleground, k8s-style secrets materialized to files work best and are conceptually close enough to the OS env.