GauntletWizard

Yes. 100% yes. Obviously and clearly, yes. Universities have huge libraries and archives. It used to be a point of pride how big their libraries and archives were. University libraries bound and collated their periodicals. They converted them to microfiche to save space, but the integrity was paramount.

Yes. Libraries should be able to back-reference every citation that is included in every paper that they publish, and so should the journals. That is paramount to the scientific method. Anything that you have not verified yourself should have a clear citation that you're able to prove.

The wayback machine doesn't archive every version of every page. If it's important/authoritative enough to be cited in an academic work, it's important enough to be archived with it. Universities should be investing in that kind of infrastructure, and it's shameful that they're not already experts.

I'm sympathetic to her cause; these robots are a waste of space, poorly designed and behaved - the ultimate bad neighbor as you walk down the street. I do believe that delivery robots are inevitable, and I welcome them when they come - but these are not that, and the combination of fees and fines should keep the current model off the streets.

It is probably easier to centralize the command and control infrastructure and AI comment generation in a few places and use proxies for posting. The bots are not independently operating, they are puppets.

Obvious but good to get confirmation. Anyone who's owned a dog knows that they can tell your mood in myriad ways, but this is the kind of basic research that is necessary to clear the way for more serious insights.

Then Uber is fucked. "This is how you do it cheaper" isn't an escape hatch, and we shouldn't accept terrible behavior just because it's cheaper.

Disclaimer: I briefly worked for Uber and quit in disgust

You've got a point, a fuck-up and a fuck-you are somewhat different in this context, though I was assuming both had malice in my original interpretation.

A big fuck-up, but some people prefer (nobly even if I don't abide by the same rule) to keep some words out of their mouths.

Jaeger doesn't really implement an otel spec - Otel wrapped itself around Jaeger.

The alternative is Prometheus (which is freaking great) and Jaegar (which is freaking great), each alone. This is better, because Otel is trying to put two distinct things (monitoring and metrics, distributed tracing) into one package, because they know how to use neither.

Neither Prometheus metrics nor Jaeger traces are magic bullets. Neither of them are complicated, either, and in fact the fact that they're not complicated is their greatest strength. You can and should understand every facet of what they entail. You should build the (very small) shims that they need for your company's framework every time. It's not hard. It's not hard because it's not complicated. The fact that it's not complicated seems to break people's brains. They are accurate because they're simple and they're easy to work with because they're simple, and OTel is neither.

I don't even have a problem with every cop being equipped with an automatic ALPR... So long as the data is not retained. I do believe that we need better auditing and oversight in response to the availability, but it's not a great evil that an APB can be virtually guaranteed to catch a car... So long as we're using them carefully and judiciously, in response to immediate and recent threats or a clearly understood long tail. There's supposed to be a balance of power; it's not evil to give the police new powers, but it is evil to give politicians unanswered and unlimited tracking of the movements of anyone they so desire.

The primitives of a tpm ("observations", which in practice map to ca-signing keys of various levels of boot stage) are a very poor match for the real world. In order for them to be usefully consistent, you have to have consistent inputs. That means you can't observe the kernel itself, but instead you observe a key that signs a kernel. This is awful when it's Microsoft signing a series of kernels that advance one-way but the TPM doesn't actually ratchet to prevent downgrade attacks (and would be even worse if it did, because then you'd inevitably brick machines again and again). Instead you trust a long-lived CA and God help you when you need to rotate it.

It's even worse if you're self-hosting the signing, to the point that despite a ton of work put into making it safe and understood I wouldn't do it with the current design; a bare-state unlock is more predictable and reliable but I'll make sure to regularly exercise my backup key and header.