2bitencryption

this is just constrained generation? I thought the latest crop of decision models (inspired by Jev) do something fundamentally different in the architecture; they're not simply off-the-shelf models with a token mask

> It's a very energetic intensive process, it cracks ribs.

I feel like lately this is becoming more common knowledge - but still something most people don't realize.

Part of it is probably the fact that it's impossible to depict "real" CPR in popular culture (movies, TV shows, etc) unless the production goes to extreme lengths to use a fake dummy. Even on The Pitt (which seems to make a point of being hyper realistic) I've seen them do "fake" CPR with shallow compressions.

I've found most of the differences to come not from the socket API, or the logical behavior, or CLI differences. But instead from assumptions Docker makes, that it's running rootful, when Podman will not (by default).

As such, most of the fixes for Podman/Docker incompatibilities is just addressing that assumption with a few extra flags on the Podman commands to change how the user namespace maps between the container and the host, etc etc.

I live moments away from this roundabout. It's confusing. Single-lane roundabouts are really straightforward. You're either clear to enter, or you're not.

Adding lanes makes it far more confusing. I consider myself, you know, pretty smart. Not stupid, at least.

But I almost sideswiped someone in this roundabout the other day. Years of driving experience gave me an intuition that the middle lane would not cross over the outer lane. E.x. a car in the inner lane would not pass through the outer lane (except at the very end). So when I saw an oncoming car in the inner lane I thoguht I was safe to enter the outer lane. Not so. The inner lane car was actually lane-changing to the outer lane (at the exact point I was about to enter the roundabout) in order to exit.

tl;dr - within the container, the exploit works, and elevates to root (uid 0) within the container - BUT because that namespace actually maps to uid 1000 (the user) outside the container, the escalation does not flow up to the host.

But… does this escape the container? If not (the author seems to indicate it does not) then does it matter if you are in Docker or rootless Podman, right, since the end result is always: you have elevated to root within the container. If the rest of the container filesystem isolation does its job, the end result is the same? Though I guess another chained exploit to escape the container would be worse in Docker? Do I have that right?

Not exactly. One can be charged with stalking, even though the offender only went to places in public that the victim also went to. If combined with a pattern of behavior that, in aggregate, infringes upon the rights of the target, it can become a crime.

The interesting part, for anyone who actually reads the article - the change was fixed in an RC and then reverted in the final release.

Which implies there was some regression, some issue, some incorrect behavior or negative impact. One has to wonder… what could it have been? What could the issue with having a more accurate clickbox for the corner of the window possibly be?

Given that the video is fully interactive and lets you move around (in a “world” if you will) I don’t think it’s a stretch to call it a world model. It must have at least some notion of physics, cause and effect, etc etc in order to achieve what it does.

I’m not sure about “dumb them down”, I suspect it’s more like “subtly influence popular opinion”.

My husbands TickTock feed is full of things like “10 things Americans do that Chinese think are weird”, “10 reasons Chinese cities are in the 22nd century” etc etc.

I personally don’t think that’s propaganda - most of it is factually true and would be pushed to the front of any fair algorithm because it is engaging. But I can kinda see the concern, even though I disagree with the outcome.

Would they? There are already data residency laws, and the US didn’t have to be on any foreign adversary list for those to work, right?

if (big if) you trust the execution environment, which is apparently auditable, and if (big if) you trust the TEE merkle hash used to sign the response is computer based on the TEE as claimed (and not a malicious actor spoofing a TEE that lives within an evil environment) and also if you trust the inference engine (vllm / sglanf, what have you) then I guess you can be confident the system is private.

Lots of ifs there, though. I do trust Moxie in terms of execution though. Doesn’t seem like the type of person to take half measures.

the ripgrep codebase is ultimate “pour a drink, settle into your coziest chair, and read some high quality software” codebase. Just click around through it and marvel.

Interesting, how many seconds of 2Gbps transfer do I get before I reach my monthly cap and they start throttling me?

Jokes aside, I'm curious how this is even possible over decades-old cable. I get there's a new DOCSIS standard, but I'm less interested in the protocol and more interested in the simple physics of it. How can a simple coaxial cable cram so much bandwidth?

Is there any company even remotely close to competing with Starlink in the "global satellite ISP" space?

I remember reading somewhere that literally most of the satellites orbiting earth are Starlink satellites. As in, more than half of all satellites are Starlink.

Obviously that statistic does not mean they have a successful business, that there's enough of a market, etc etc.

But one can imagine the types of services you can supply in just a few years to customers when you have by far the largest satellite constellation in the sky, with global coverage, and the ability to launch dozens of new satellites at low cost.