You're probably right that firewalls allow negligence elsewhere.
But if they can't secure their one firewall, what makes you think they can secure their complex network of a plethora of interdependent services running across many subdomains on a whole roomfull of machines?
"Simple" is a key step to effective security, and I think the reason we've latched on to firewalls is they are often the simplest, most contained, and most standard way to reduce the attack surface of your network.
But if they can't secure their one firewall, what makes you think they can secure their complex network of a plethora of interdependent services running across many subdomains on a whole roomfull of machines?
"Simple" is a key step to effective security, and I think the reason we've latched on to firewalls is they are often the simplest, most contained, and most standard way to reduce the attack surface of your network.