It's possible that NSA can recover keys from 1024-bit RSA/DH/DSA handshakes, but it's extraordinarily unlikely that they can do so scalably; that would be an ability that currently qualifies as space-alien technology.
RC4 is terribly broken and should be disabled. But the practical attack on RC4 requires many repetitions of the same plaintext --- "many" in the millions. This is a real threat to HTTPS/TLS, but not as much to RC4. Even hypothetical improvements to Fluhrer/McGrew would still require lots of repetitions. Disable RC4, but if you're playing along at home, this probably isn't it.
No serious cryptographer seems to believe that the NIST curves are backdoored. Avoid them if you can; they suck for other reasons.
RC4 is terribly broken and should be disabled. But the practical attack on RC4 requires many repetitions of the same plaintext --- "many" in the millions. This is a real threat to HTTPS/TLS, but not as much to RC4. Even hypothetical improvements to Fluhrer/McGrew would still require lots of repetitions. Disable RC4, but if you're playing along at home, this probably isn't it.
No serious cryptographer seems to believe that the NIST curves are backdoored. Avoid them if you can; they suck for other reasons.
MD5 is survivable in the HMAC construction.