There is zero control over what public keys get handed over to your phone to encrypt an iMessage with. For all we know, whenever you want to send a message to $USER, your phone gets a public key for $USERs iPhone, her iPad and the NSA master key.
Tim Cook can state that they can't decrypt the message all he wants, but as long as there's no control over what public keys we encrypt the message with, the statement that Apple or the NSA can't read the messages is a half-truth at best.
Don't use iMessage for anything you wouldn't be using email for. Assume every message you send over iMessage to be public.
>If the government laid a subpoena to get iMessages, we can’t provide it. It’s encrypted and we don’t have a key. And so it’s sort of — the door is closed.
But the government can (and probably has) force you to have the phones send a copy of every message to some government server encrypted with the government's public key. They don't need to subpoena messages - they already got them all.
Tim Cook can state that they can't decrypt the message all he wants, but as long as there's no control over what public keys we encrypt the message with, the statement that Apple or the NSA can't read the messages is a half-truth at best.
Don't use iMessage for anything you wouldn't be using email for. Assume every message you send over iMessage to be public.
>If the government laid a subpoena to get iMessages, we can’t provide it. It’s encrypted and we don’t have a key. And so it’s sort of — the door is closed.
But the government can (and probably has) force you to have the phones send a copy of every message to some government server encrypted with the government's public key. They don't need to subpoena messages - they already got them all.