>The unfortunate conclusion is that in the future, someone like Snowden might immediately be caught.
I think that is too naive. Snowden types don't assume they won't be caught, they probably assume that it is only a matter of time until they are caught, and play the cards they have in such a way that you make it really hard to send your garden variety cia/dia/spec ops/defense contractors out on a pick up operation not only only from a feasibility standpoint, but from a geopolitical stand point (e.g. What will Beijing's/Moscow's/D.C.'s response be if we run such an operation in their front yard? What precedents might we be setting?).
Also to note that offensive/defensive technical capabilities aren't as asymmetric as they appear for all possible targets of nation states, some yes, but probably not as much to those with the technical knowledge who can create/use such and derivative systems which might very well be other nation states (or appearing to originate from such).
I think that is too naive. Snowden types don't assume they won't be caught, they probably assume that it is only a matter of time until they are caught, and play the cards they have in such a way that you make it really hard to send your garden variety cia/dia/spec ops/defense contractors out on a pick up operation not only only from a feasibility standpoint, but from a geopolitical stand point (e.g. What will Beijing's/Moscow's/D.C.'s response be if we run such an operation in their front yard? What precedents might we be setting?).
Also to note that offensive/defensive technical capabilities aren't as asymmetric as they appear for all possible targets of nation states, some yes, but probably not as much to those with the technical knowledge who can create/use such and derivative systems which might very well be other nation states (or appearing to originate from such).