A Mig-25 (fielded 1964) was allegedly clocked on radar over Israel in 1973 doing Mach 3.2.
How long it took to figure out that the thing's afterburners were stuck in the full-on position, how long it took to realize it wasn't equipped with adequate targeting or missiles- unknown. While the Mig-31 (1981) was indeed engineered to make a real stand, and this article talks to that, I don't think this article builds a case for or against anyone having any real idea whether the SR-71 (1966) was vulnerable to the Mig-25 or not. If the question is "what repelled the SR71," the question isn't the technical merits of the Mig-31, it's the question of what was known v.s. unknown about what when.
The question of the Mig-25's capabilities were answered more clearly after Viktor Belenko defected with one in 1976. It was not a threat. How long it took to figure that out, and American confidence that Viktor's Mig-25 was as good as any other they'd likely see, remain unknown factors. The Mig-31 (1981) wasn't really much faster, leading to the carefully coordinated chase described in the article, but it at least had an electronics suite, radar, communications link, and armaments capable of making it's threat visibly apparent.
Certainly the Zaslon phased-array radar is impressive and the R-33 missile specs give it the on paper capabilities to hit a SR-71. Yet the article's talks of only two events where an interception occurred, one undated, the second in 1986, after the first major upgrade to the Zaslon radar and the whole time using the very first Soviet in flight digital computer, acquiring targets for a 1970's designed missile the R-33 (fielded 1981).
How long it took to figure out that the thing's afterburners were stuck in the full-on position, how long it took to realize it wasn't equipped with adequate targeting or missiles- unknown. While the Mig-31 (1981) was indeed engineered to make a real stand, and this article talks to that, I don't think this article builds a case for or against anyone having any real idea whether the SR-71 (1966) was vulnerable to the Mig-25 or not. If the question is "what repelled the SR71," the question isn't the technical merits of the Mig-31, it's the question of what was known v.s. unknown about what when.
The question of the Mig-25's capabilities were answered more clearly after Viktor Belenko defected with one in 1976. It was not a threat. How long it took to figure that out, and American confidence that Viktor's Mig-25 was as good as any other they'd likely see, remain unknown factors. The Mig-31 (1981) wasn't really much faster, leading to the carefully coordinated chase described in the article, but it at least had an electronics suite, radar, communications link, and armaments capable of making it's threat visibly apparent.
Certainly the Zaslon phased-array radar is impressive and the R-33 missile specs give it the on paper capabilities to hit a SR-71. Yet the article's talks of only two events where an interception occurred, one undated, the second in 1986, after the first major upgrade to the Zaslon radar and the whole time using the very first Soviet in flight digital computer, acquiring targets for a 1970's designed missile the R-33 (fielded 1981).