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Comment by horsawlarway

I find their post to be a little light on details, but my read is that they're essentially doing what you're complaining they should.

They're mapping the identity back to "agent" instead of "person". With the optional ability for the agent to present an "agent:person" combo in cases where it was triggered by a person.

Some quotes that imply but don't actually technically clarify what I mean:

> we now had a way to treat each cloud agent session as its own identity

> Once the human approves, access is scoped to the cloud agent session ID and the specific database that was requested.

> Using OIDC, cloud agents can request and be approved for short-lived access as they would with databases above. Requests are always logged in Formal and attributed to both the cloud agent and the engineer that launched it.

It sounds like they're not just attesting that the agent is the person, they're always scoping to a new combined identity.

So there's no confusion over whether it was a person, an agent, or an agent started by a person. (however where you go from there for culpability is a different question...)

But it doesn't seem like there's a case where a person did a thing (with their own credentials) and can then point a finger at an agent as say "oh it went rogue".

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