If your argument is that we should stick rather closer to the RFCs and wire-level truths when explaining TLS and the eMuhdra situation to laypeople, I wish you all the best in your endeavor.
I find that communicating just enough to allow the formation of an roughly accurate threat model better retains attention; and in this particular situation I was being somewhat glib to emphasize the point of how insane our PKI system is.
> IF they first spook DNS
Or arp poison, or BGP hijack, or get in-path via tenancy shenanigans... TLS exists, premised on the literal assumption that such things are possible. If your argument is that we don't need to worry about a TLS weakness because such things are hard, I'd ask why we even bother then. CA compromise is the literal worst-case in PKI-world.
I find that communicating just enough to allow the formation of an roughly accurate threat model better retains attention; and in this particular situation I was being somewhat glib to emphasize the point of how insane our PKI system is.
> IF they first spook DNS
Or arp poison, or BGP hijack, or get in-path via tenancy shenanigans... TLS exists, premised on the literal assumption that such things are possible. If your argument is that we don't need to worry about a TLS weakness because such things are hard, I'd ask why we even bother then. CA compromise is the literal worst-case in PKI-world.