> The solution is a quasi-share split: Meta is creating a new Class C stock, with zero votes per share. Shareholders will get one no-vote Class C share for every one-vote Class A share or 10-vote Class B share that they currently own. Zuckerberg, who owns about 341 million high-vote Class B shares (and like 1 million low-vote shares), will get about 342 million new zero-vote shares; all the other shareholders, who own about 3.4 billion low-vote shares, will get 3.4 billion new no-vote shares.
And in the footnotes:
> Stock exchange rules prevent already-public companies from creating new high-vote shares, or from distributing new low/zero-vote shares in non-proportional ways. So Meta could not, for instance, give Zuckerberg a big dividend of voting shares while giving everyone else a big dividend of zero-vote shares. But this mechanism — giving everyone the same dividend of zero-voting shares — works.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/newsletters/2026-10-22/zuc...
> The solution is a quasi-share split: Meta is creating a new Class C stock, with zero votes per share. Shareholders will get one no-vote Class C share for every one-vote Class A share or 10-vote Class B share that they currently own. Zuckerberg, who owns about 341 million high-vote Class B shares (and like 1 million low-vote shares), will get about 342 million new zero-vote shares; all the other shareholders, who own about 3.4 billion low-vote shares, will get 3.4 billion new no-vote shares.
And in the footnotes:
> Stock exchange rules prevent already-public companies from creating new high-vote shares, or from distributing new low/zero-vote shares in non-proportional ways. So Meta could not, for instance, give Zuckerberg a big dividend of voting shares while giving everyone else a big dividend of zero-vote shares. But this mechanism — giving everyone the same dividend of zero-voting shares — works.