Hi fny,
That's fair feedback. What I'm trying to express is the complexity of it.
For this to work:
1. The attacker had to get access to our internal gateway
2. Claude code had to embed the github oauth cli token in tool call responses (not directly, but as part of an embedded url call).
3. We had to enable request/response logging.
4. The attacker had to be aware of this token logging circumstance, then harvest multiple user account tokens (one of which had to belong
to an org admin)
5. The attacker had to wait for / hope that we would expand the release trust boundary (as we did on Monday)
among other things. This wasn't a "whoops we had shitty governance around our auth tokens" kind of situation, it involved a number of non-trivial circumstances many of which were beyond the attacker's direct control, including Claude Code behavior of which we were not previously aware of, and a sophisticated attacker.
- Krrish
That's fair feedback. What I'm trying to express is the complexity of it.
For this to work:
1. The attacker had to get access to our internal gateway
2. Claude code had to embed the github oauth cli token in tool call responses (not directly, but as part of an embedded url call).
3. We had to enable request/response logging.
4. The attacker had to be aware of this token logging circumstance, then harvest multiple user account tokens (one of which had to belong to an org admin)
5. The attacker had to wait for / hope that we would expand the release trust boundary (as we did on Monday)
among other things. This wasn't a "whoops we had shitty governance around our auth tokens" kind of situation, it involved a number of non-trivial circumstances many of which were beyond the attacker's direct control, including Claude Code behavior of which we were not previously aware of, and a sophisticated attacker.
- Krrish