This doesn’t make sense to me. I don’t think of causes as discrete things, just like physical fields don’t consist of discrete strands in time; nevertheless the field equations completely determine what happens from one moment to the next.
If as you say you take a set of causes and contemplate a weight distribution on them that determines the outcome, then that weight distribution is just another thing that either has reasons for why it is the way it is, or it doesn’t and then is just random; or a mix of both.
> Further, your same argument could be used to support the idea that causation doesn’t exist.
How so?
I actually don’t think of causation as a fundamental notion, but as an emergent one. What’s fundamental are the consistency constraints that adjacent events are subject to.
> A further problem is attempting to enclose and limit reality within logic, which we know to be a finite rule system and subject to specific limitations as such.
I don’t agree that (a) logic is necessarily finite, and (b) if it is finite, that it would limit reality in any way that contradicts our observations.
If as you say you take a set of causes and contemplate a weight distribution on them that determines the outcome, then that weight distribution is just another thing that either has reasons for why it is the way it is, or it doesn’t and then is just random; or a mix of both.
> Further, your same argument could be used to support the idea that causation doesn’t exist.
How so?
I actually don’t think of causation as a fundamental notion, but as an emergent one. What’s fundamental are the consistency constraints that adjacent events are subject to.
> A further problem is attempting to enclose and limit reality within logic, which we know to be a finite rule system and subject to specific limitations as such.
I don’t agree that (a) logic is necessarily finite, and (b) if it is finite, that it would limit reality in any way that contradicts our observations.