>I expect the code to be exactly what has been reviewed by me under that hash
Sorry, no.
Again, hashes are by definition, insecure. I.e. you don't have a guarantee that the hash references the same commit, just a (very, very strong) probability that it does.
> Everything else would just be a crazy invitation to make supply chain attacks uncircumventable.
What? Uncircumventable? Logically equivalent, I read your statement as "So if all cars are not blue then they must be red"? This does not follow...
I like the last part of the article, which proposes a (very reasonable sounding) extension for people who care (more) about their code-sec. You should be able to swap out your hash algo without having to rebuild your content addressing system.
Separation of Concerns, people...
Sorry, no.
Again, hashes are by definition, insecure. I.e. you don't have a guarantee that the hash references the same commit, just a (very, very strong) probability that it does.
> Everything else would just be a crazy invitation to make supply chain attacks uncircumventable.
What? Uncircumventable? Logically equivalent, I read your statement as "So if all cars are not blue then they must be red"? This does not follow...
I like the last part of the article, which proposes a (very reasonable sounding) extension for people who care (more) about their code-sec. You should be able to swap out your hash algo without having to rebuild your content addressing system.
Separation of Concerns, people...