Maybe I'm not "using it right" but I often spin up my own MCPs as an authorisation control mechanism, as a wrapper around existing tools. For example, an MCP server that can only do GET requests. This way I can stay relatively secure about the fact that when the agent uses the MCP, it isn't going to mistakenly execute something I didn't want it to.
I know there are other ways to achieve this but to me this, but they all seem "soft" controls - a hard limitation feels more reassuring than simply a line in context that says "don't do this".
In the spirit of the linked post, one could argue I should just write cli wrappers - but I think I like the explicit routing of `Agent -> MCP -> available tools` instead of `Agent -> available tools`. The former lets me control the surface available to the agent. While LLMs are smarter now, at the same time, the applications that use those LLMs have become more assuming of what I want to allow them to do. I don't want to be one hallucination away from a disaster.
I know there are other ways to achieve this but to me this, but they all seem "soft" controls - a hard limitation feels more reassuring than simply a line in context that says "don't do this".
In the spirit of the linked post, one could argue I should just write cli wrappers - but I think I like the explicit routing of `Agent -> MCP -> available tools` instead of `Agent -> available tools`. The former lets me control the surface available to the agent. While LLMs are smarter now, at the same time, the applications that use those LLMs have become more assuming of what I want to allow them to do. I don't want to be one hallucination away from a disaster.