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Comment by kurdman_007

Hi HN — maker here. I built Talos because I wanted to hand an agent a terminal without handing it my trust model. Every tool call (read, write, exec, delegate) passes a small deterministic kernel, ~645 lines of Python, that returns allow, needs-human or deny. Unattended runs can't ask, so needs-human becomes deny. The agent can never grant itself anything.

Around that kernel: 23 gated tools, a UID-separated worker for delegated code, MCP servers confined to that worker from an operator-owned registry (no marketplace, no third-party code in the agent process), a hash-chained audit log, Ed25519-signed updates verified before anything unpacks, and a read-only live dashboard that has no approve button, by design.

Numbers the CI enforces on every page of the site: 2063 tests, 179/179 adversarial cases, 645 kernel lines, 0 inbound ports. The site has a browser reimplementation of the policy kernel you can poke at without installing anything, a replayed real session, and an honest comparison to OpenClaw and Hermes — including what Talos doesn't have (breadth; that's doctrine, not backlog).

Happy to answer anything — especially the parts where the design is wrong.

Site: https://talos-agent.ch — Source (MIT): https://github.com/talos-kernel/talos

parent kurdman_007 2 months ago

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