> rejected any notion of utility. It would be fundamentally wrong for you to ask what's the value of solving the Erdős–Hajnal conjecture; the value is that it's solved.
I disagree. Mathematicians care about the utility of a result. It is just that they regard mathematical understanding as a valid type of utility, and that can be arbitrarily far removed from practical utility. But a proof that doesn't help anyone understand anything interesting is not valued. I could go out and define some pointless construction and create proofs about it immediately. It would only matter if I connect it to some other subject of interest within math.
I would argue that mathematical understanding is valuable for extrinsic reasons, but it is true that by the time you're a math grad student, you're usually willing to pursue it for no external purpose.
I disagree. Mathematicians care about the utility of a result. It is just that they regard mathematical understanding as a valid type of utility, and that can be arbitrarily far removed from practical utility. But a proof that doesn't help anyone understand anything interesting is not valued. I could go out and define some pointless construction and create proofs about it immediately. It would only matter if I connect it to some other subject of interest within math.
I would argue that mathematical understanding is valuable for extrinsic reasons, but it is true that by the time you're a math grad student, you're usually willing to pursue it for no external purpose.
Although not a mathematician, Daniel Dennett had a wonderful example about higher order truths of "chmess". https://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/ph445/notes/den...