Everything on your list except one is possible with servers + crypto.
The exception is permissionless operation. Any server-based design has an "operator" who can be compromised. The network should outlive the operator, function without it. Infrastructure servers that I set up (in order to reduce user onboarding friction) shut down in about 2 weeks. The app will keep working without me.
Regarding the extra complexity - the design was "no privileged party at all", the price is the complexity.
You're right about the DHT metadata -> queries expose requester IP to nodes on the path, so designing a social graph is possible. However, that is exactly why there are two modes:
- fast mode, which basically trades metadata privacy for lower latency and calls
- anonymous routes everything (DHT queries also) over Tor
Regarding compromise recovery, you're also correct. That is on top of the v2 list.
> Additionally with the group size limits, lack of forward secrecy/post compromise security
Direct (1:1) chats rotate keys every 15 messages - I thought about a similar approach for group chats, but it turned out to be very noisy, also a v2 feature to address.
You mentioned some valid flaws, but none of them seem fundamental/unsolvable. Of course, there is going to be a certain kind of trade-off when going fully decentralized, but these trade-offs are becoming smaller and smaller each day. In return, we are getting our privacy back. There is still a long way to go regarding the things that you mentioned, but also some basic UX:
- Mobile app
- Anonymous mode Tor alternative (thought about I2P, but it's very slow)
- Calls in anonymous mode
...
Regarding the extra complexity - the design was "no privileged party at all", the price is the complexity.
You're right about the DHT metadata -> queries expose requester IP to nodes on the path, so designing a social graph is possible. However, that is exactly why there are two modes:
- fast mode, which basically trades metadata privacy for lower latency and calls - anonymous routes everything (DHT queries also) over Tor
Regarding compromise recovery, you're also correct. That is on top of the v2 list.
> Additionally with the group size limits, lack of forward secrecy/post compromise security Direct (1:1) chats rotate keys every 15 messages - I thought about a similar approach for group chats, but it turned out to be very noisy, also a v2 feature to address.
You mentioned some valid flaws, but none of them seem fundamental/unsolvable. Of course, there is going to be a certain kind of trade-off when going fully decentralized, but these trade-offs are becoming smaller and smaller each day. In return, we are getting our privacy back. There is still a long way to go regarding the things that you mentioned, but also some basic UX: - Mobile app - Anonymous mode Tor alternative (thought about I2P, but it's very slow) - Calls in anonymous mode ...