Direct system calls are an amazing idea. The NtDll and bsd models are worse. The whole libc becomes a security boundary without the protection of kernel space. So much windows malware and process tampering happens because now you have a library (ntdll) fully in userspace that is given special privileges, which now becomes a huge attack surface. Then you have to deal with breakages between the built in libc versions and the kernel
This syscall overhead isn't as much as you suppose it is; for workloads where the syscall overhead actually makes a difference there are robust low-syscall paths for io/latency sensitive operations with DPDK, io_uring, and futex being a few examples.
And there are robust performant methods on linux for syscall interception/tracing, see seccomp unotify, bpf tracepoints, ftrace.
This syscall overhead isn't as much as you suppose it is; for workloads where the syscall overhead actually makes a difference there are robust low-syscall paths for io/latency sensitive operations with DPDK, io_uring, and futex being a few examples.
And there are robust performant methods on linux for syscall interception/tracing, see seccomp unotify, bpf tracepoints, ftrace.