It will be interesting to see what happens. One thing I really like about the US federal system is how each jurisdiction applies massive economic interventions. We get to run many experiments and see what happens. I recall that I was curious about the Seattle driver minimum wage law and the results were so interesting to me[0]:
> We find that the minimum pay law raised delivery pay per task, though the increases in base pay per task were partially offset by a substantial reduction in average tips, a major component of delivery pay. At the same time, the policy led to a reduction in the number of tasks completed by highly attached incumbent drivers (but not an increase in exit from delivery work), completely offsetting increased pay per task and leading to zero effect on monthly earnings. We find evidence that drivers experienced more unpaid idle time and longer distances driven between tasks, but find no evidence that drivers reduced their total time working on delivery apps and only limited evidence of switching from delivery to ride-hailing work. Using a simple model of the labor market for platform delivery drivers, we show that our evidence is consistent with free entry of drivers into the delivery market driving down the task-finding rate until expected earnings return to their pre-reform level. These findings highlight the challenges of raising pay in spot markets for tasks where there is free entry of workers.
> We find that the minimum pay law raised delivery pay per task, though the increases in base pay per task were partially offset by a substantial reduction in average tips, a major component of delivery pay. At the same time, the policy led to a reduction in the number of tasks completed by highly attached incumbent drivers (but not an increase in exit from delivery work), completely offsetting increased pay per task and leading to zero effect on monthly earnings. We find evidence that drivers experienced more unpaid idle time and longer distances driven between tasks, but find no evidence that drivers reduced their total time working on delivery apps and only limited evidence of switching from delivery to ride-hailing work. Using a simple model of the labor market for platform delivery drivers, we show that our evidence is consistent with free entry of drivers into the delivery market driving down the task-finding rate until expected earnings return to their pre-reform level. These findings highlight the challenges of raising pay in spot markets for tasks where there is free entry of workers.
0: https://www.nber.org/papers/w34545