1. I would hope the default seccomp policy blocks AF_ALG in these containers. I bet it doesn’t. Oh well.
2. The write-to-RO-page-cache primitive STILL WORKED! It’s just that the particular exploit used had no meaningful effect in the already-root-in-a-container context. If you think you are safe, you’re probably wrong. All you need to make a new exploit is an fd representing something that you aren’t supposed to be able to write. This likely includes CoW things where you are supposed to be able to write after CoW but you aren’t supposed to be able to write to the source.
So:
- Are you using these containers with a common image or even a common layer in an image to isolate dangerous workloads from each other. Oops, they can modify the image layers and corrupt each other. There goes any sort of cross-tenant isolation.
- What if you get an fd backed by the zero page and write to it? This can’t result in anything that the administrator would approve of.
- What if you ro-bind-mount something in? It’s not ro any more.
1. I would hope the default seccomp policy blocks AF_ALG in these containers. I bet it doesn’t. Oh well.
2. The write-to-RO-page-cache primitive STILL WORKED! It’s just that the particular exploit used had no meaningful effect in the already-root-in-a-container context. If you think you are safe, you’re probably wrong. All you need to make a new exploit is an fd representing something that you aren’t supposed to be able to write. This likely includes CoW things where you are supposed to be able to write after CoW but you aren’t supposed to be able to write to the source.
So:
- Are you using these containers with a common image or even a common layer in an image to isolate dangerous workloads from each other. Oops, they can modify the image layers and corrupt each other. There goes any sort of cross-tenant isolation.
- What if you get an fd backed by the zero page and write to it? This can’t result in anything that the administrator would approve of.
- What if you ro-bind-mount something in? It’s not ro any more.