To be clear: This is not my position! I advocate for service accounts in my post:
> It is much harder to reason about, say, the security of an arbitrary Engineer's laptop than it is an EC2 instance that exists exclusively to tell KMS to sign something.
> So every time we fire or lay off the person whose name is on the automation, we need to rotate the keys?
If a person previously had access to the key and knowledge of the key gives you control over that automated workflow, is that key (and by extension that workflow) still worth trusting?
To be clear: This is not my position! I advocate for service accounts in my post:
> It is much harder to reason about, say, the security of an arbitrary Engineer's laptop than it is an EC2 instance that exists exclusively to tell KMS to sign something.
> So every time we fire or lay off the person whose name is on the automation, we need to rotate the keys?
If a person previously had access to the key and knowledge of the key gives you control over that automated workflow, is that key (and by extension that workflow) still worth trusting?