Nice upgrade. userpsace HTTP proxies are a good start and should make unlikely that a secret gets into the context window due to a high permission read. There are a few missing pieces in the agent security world in general
1. Full secret-memory isolation whereby an agent with root privileges can't exfilrate. Let's assume my agent is prompt injected to write a full-permissions script to spin up OneCli, modify the docker container, log all of the requests w/ secrets to a file outside the container, exfiltrate.
2. An intent layer on top of agents that models "you have access to my gmail (authN) but you can only act on emails where you are a participant". This would be more similar to universal RBAC between agent ↔ mcp etc.
I've been building on [2] for a while now using signed tokens expressing intent.
1. Full secret-memory isolation whereby an agent with root privileges can't exfilrate. Let's assume my agent is prompt injected to write a full-permissions script to spin up OneCli, modify the docker container, log all of the requests w/ secrets to a file outside the container, exfiltrate.
2. An intent layer on top of agents that models "you have access to my gmail (authN) but you can only act on emails where you are a participant". This would be more similar to universal RBAC between agent ↔ mcp etc.
I've been building on [2] for a while now using signed tokens expressing intent.