When we let the market bubble-up protective conditions through buyer behavior, we advantage innovation at the cost of accepting more harms, because the market response is always reactive instead of proactive, and the reaction can sometimes take decades or more (like GHG emissions and global warming).
When we let structural regulations assert protective conditions on a market, we try to advantage proactive harm reduction at the cost of innovation, because artificial market limitations will be barriers to innovation and create secondary game conditions that advantage some players.
Which way we lean should depend on the type and severity of potential harms, especially with consideration of how permanent or non-reversible those harms are.
When we let structural regulations assert protective conditions on a market, we try to advantage proactive harm reduction at the cost of innovation, because artificial market limitations will be barriers to innovation and create secondary game conditions that advantage some players.
Which way we lean should depend on the type and severity of potential harms, especially with consideration of how permanent or non-reversible those harms are.