Same. I feel the Chinese room argument is a nice thing to clarify thinking.
Two systems, one feels intuitively like it understands, one doesn’t. But the two systems are functionally identical.
Therefore either my concept of “understanding” is broken, my intuition is wrong, or the concept as a whole is not useful at the edges.
I think it’s the last one. If a bunch of valves can’t understand but a bunch of chemicals and electrical signals can if it’s in someone’s head then I am simply applying “does it seem like biology” as part of the definition and can therefore ignore it entirely when considering machines or programs.
Searle seems to just go the other way and I don’t under Why.
Two systems, one feels intuitively like it understands, one doesn’t. But the two systems are functionally identical.
Therefore either my concept of “understanding” is broken, my intuition is wrong, or the concept as a whole is not useful at the edges.
I think it’s the last one. If a bunch of valves can’t understand but a bunch of chemicals and electrical signals can if it’s in someone’s head then I am simply applying “does it seem like biology” as part of the definition and can therefore ignore it entirely when considering machines or programs.
Searle seems to just go the other way and I don’t under Why.